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PUBLIC ACTORS IN PRIVATE MARKETS:
TOWARD A DEVELOPMENTAL FINANCE STATE
ROBERT C. HOCKETT
SAULE T. OMAROVA
ABSTRACT
The recent financial crisis brought into sharp relief fundamental
questions about the social function and purpose of the financial system,
including its relation to the “real” economy. This Article argues that, to
answer these questions, we must recapture a distinctively American view
of the proper relations among state, financial market, and development.
This programmatic vision—captured in what we call a “developmental
finance state”—is based on three key propositions: (1) that economic and
social development is not an “end-state” but a continuing national policy
priority; (2) that the modalities of finance are the most potent means of
fueling development; and (3) that the state, as the most potent financial
actor, both must and often does pursue its developmental goals by acting
endogenously—i.e., as a direct participant in private financial markets. In
addition to articulating and elaborating the concept of the developmental
finance state, this Article identifies and analyzes the principal modalities
through which the modern American developmental finance state operates
today. Finally, the Article proposes three broad strategic extensions of the
existing modalities, with a view to enabling the emergence of a more
ambitiously proactive and effective developmental finance state—and thus
rediscovering a truly public-minded finance.
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The spontaneous transition to new pursuits, in a community long
habituated to different ones, may be expected to be attended with
proportionally greater difficulty . . . . In many cases they would not
happen . . . . To produce the desirable changes, as early as may be
expedient, may therefore require the incitement and patronage of
government.1
[A] Bank is not a mere matter of private property, but a political
machine of the greatest importance to the State.2
INTRODUCTION
It is surprising that many Americans assume there to be only two,
mutually exclusive and poetically French-named, options for defining
governments’ relations to markets: “dirigisme” and “laissez faire.” Many
academic and policy battles have been, and continue to be, fought on this
uncompromisingly binary conceptual field. It is especially surprising
because our polity never has been strictly “command-and-control” or
“hands-off” in relation to our economy. Rather, we have always sought
means of proactively fostering and furthering economic development and
growth, and have done so through government instrumentalities that act in
markets as much as they act on them. Our government is more than merely
a market overseer and regulator—it is also a direct market participant,
acting not only to correct market failures or to provide vital public goods
but also to create, amplify, and guide private markets in ways that enhance
these markets’ potential to serve important long-term public interests.
This Article—part of a larger project—identifies, analyzes, and builds
upon the distinctly American mode of mixing polity and economy, in
hopes of recovering a policy approach that the nation once had and could
use again now, after a major financial crisis.3 The tradition we seek to
recover traces its roots directly to ideas originally formulated by the
country’s first Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton. We refer to that
1. Alexander Hamilton, Report on the Subject of Manufactures, in ALEXANDER HAMILTON:
WRITINGS 647, 670–71 (Joanne B. Freeman ed., 2001) [hereinafter Report on Manufactures].
2. Alexander Hamilton, Report on a National Bank, in ALEXANDER HAMILTON: WRITINGS,
supra note 1, at 575, 599 [hereinafter Report on a National Bank].
3. Of course, distinctly American does not mean uniquely American. As discussed below, in the
nineteenth–twentieth centuries, many countries adopted this general approach to mixing polity and
economy in pursuit of their own national goals. See infra notes 31–34 and accompanying text. Today,
many countries continue to work on adapting it to their own needs. Here, we merely seek to remind
our readers of the deeply American origins of this venerable policy tradition.
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tradition under the conceptual heading of the “developmental finance
state.”
The developmental finance state bears three basic attributes. First, it
treats national socio-economic development not as a particular end-state
but as an ongoing process of conscious, forward-looking change against a
backdrop of basic financial and macroeconomic stability. Second, it
specifically targets financial markets and uses modalities of finance in
pursuit of its developmental goals. Third, the developmental finance state
operates as an integral part of private markets, deliberately bringing
private and public actors together as partners in the ongoing nationaldevelopment project. In so doing, it defies and blurs the categorical publicprivate divide so often assumed in debates on financial regulation.
By tentatively outlining the model of our modern American
developmental finance state, this Article makes an original contribution to
several well-established strands in legal and social science scholarship,
while nevertheless claiming its own distinctive intellectual territory.4 We
examine the critically important nexus between the state, finance, and
development from a unique perspective.5 Rather than drawing broad
institutional comparisons on a grand state-market-society canvas, we focus
on the specific modalities of state action within, rather than upon, financial
markets. In this vein, we start defining the concept of a developmental
4. Our project builds upon, and speaks to, a multidisciplinary set of literatures, including legal
scholarship on various aspects of finance and financial services regulation, multiple literatures on
public-private relations and dynamics, and social science research on institutional political economy,
industrial policy, and the developmental state. For a sample of relevant recent social science research,
see Karl Aiginger & Susanne Sieber, The Matrix Approach to Industrial Policy, 20 INT’L REV.
APPLIED ECON. 573 (2006); Ben Clift & Cornelia Woll, Economic Patriotism: Reinventing Control
over Open Markets, 19 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 307 (2012); Robert H. Wade, Return of Industrial Policy?,
26 INT’L REV. APPLIED ECON. 223 (2012). For classic expositions of the developmental state model,
see ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA’S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION (1989);
PETER EVANS, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY: STATES AND INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION (1995);
CHALMERS JOHNSON, JAPAN: WHO GOVERNS?: THE RISE OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE (1995);
ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN
EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (1990). For an overview of development theory and the current state
of the developmental state scholarship, see Peter Evans, The Developmental State: Divergent
Responses to Modern Economic Theory and the Twenty-First-Century Economy, in THE END OF THE
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE? 220 (Michelle Williams ed., 2014).
5. Generally, much of the scholarly analysis of developmental policies in modern Europe and
East Asia focused on the fundamental structure of individual countries’ national finance. See, e.g.,
Chalmers Johnson, Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business
Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW ASIAN
INDUSTRIALISM 136 (Frederic C. Deyo ed., 1987); JUNG-EN WOO, RACE TO THE SWIFT: STATE AND
FINANCE IN KOREAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (1991); JOHN ZYSMAN, GOVERNMENTS, MARKETS, AND
GROWTH: FINANCIAL SYSTEMS AND THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL CHANGE (1983).
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finance state inductively, through description and analysis of its currently
existing modalities.
We argue that the government is an important endogenous actor in
today’s financial markets and construct a provisional taxonomy of the
roles the government plays in that capacity. We define these roles as
market-making, market-moving, market-levering, and market-preserving.6
The primary goal of our taxonomy-building exercise is to elucidate the
hidden or under-appreciated threads of common meaning behind
seemingly unrelated, and often all too familiar, phenomena. In effect, we
reveal the face of the modern American developmental finance state.
Importantly, our taxonomy provides a conceptual apparatus and
operational vocabulary indispensable for a systematic recognition and
examination of public instrumentalities’ existing market-actor practices
across a wide range of issues.7
We further argue that a functional taxonomy of present government-asmarket-actor roles has potentially significant forward-looking public
policy implications. It provides a conceptual framework for envisioning
expansions of identified modalities beyond their current forms. To this
end, we engage in an explicitly normative, prescriptive undertaking that
aims to test both the public-policy relevance of our analysis and the
conceptual reach of our provisional model of a developmental finance
state. We argue that the normative justification for the government’s
action in private markets should go well beyond the traditional marketfailure and public-goods arguments. Instead of acting only to correct some
specific market failure or to supply some traditional public good,
government instrumentalities should use their unique ability to harness the
power of private financial markets for the purpose of promoting long-term
national development and ensuring financial and macroeconomic stability.
We advance several proposals for expanding the scope and intensity of
the government’s financial market-actor functions, in pursuit of a more
coherent, comprehensive, and normatively emboldened agenda. In
particular, we propose adopting a broad asset-price stability maintenance
6. See infra Parts I.B.2, II.
7. In this respect, our argument complements and contributes to a broader emerging trend in
social science research that explicitly recognizes and examines the central role of the state in creating
markets for technological innovation and shaping knowledge-based growth. See generally MARIANA
MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS
(2014) (examining the entrepreneurial role of the state in knowledge-intensive industries); Fred Block,
Swimming Against the Current: The Rise of a Hidden Developmental State in the United States, 36
POL. & SOC’Y 169 (2008) (analyzing the critical role of the US government’s developmental intiatives
in supporting scientific and technological advances).
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program, establishing a public-private national investment and
infrastructure-financing vehicle, and creating a special “golden share”
regime for financial firms’ internal governance.8 In many ways, our
proposals are unorthodox and ambitious thought experiments. We paint a
broad picture, which inevitably glosses over a number of important issues
related to institutional design, procedural framework, and broader
political-economic substance of the proposed arrangements—issues we are
planning to address in future work. The goal of this Article is not to offer a
ready-to-use legislative blueprint but to push our collective imagination
beyond the constraints of current discourse, to show how this new
perspective on the role of public actors in private financial markets opens
up new policy terrain, rich with possibility.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the historical origins
of what we are calling the developmental finance state model and
elaborates the key parameters of that concept. Part II constructs a basic
taxonomy of market-actor roles that federal government instrumentalities
have been playing since at least the New Deal era. Part III advances three
separate sets of policy proposals aimed at extending the federal
government’s market-actor functions beyond their current forms, in order
to enable the emergence of a more coherent and effective developmental
finance state. The Conclusion offers brief closing remarks and looks
forward to next steps in this project.
I. STATE, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT: REDISCOVERING THE LINK
A. American Origins of the Developmental Finance State: The Forgotten
Heritage
Contrary to today’s dominant narrative, the concept of a strong
centralized government actively pursuing a coherent national
developmental strategy is very much an American idea. The first US
Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, was the first modern
statesman to put forward a comprehensive plan of state-led economic
development as the basis for attaining and maintaining true national
independence and prosperity.9 In sharp contrast to Thomas Jefferson’s
8. See infra Part III.
9. For detailed accounts of Alexander Hamilton’s life and ideas, see generally RON CHERNOW,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON (2004); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM
(1993); FORREST MCDONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A BIOGRAPHY (1979); BROADUS MITCHELL,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A CONCISE BIOGRAPHY (1976); see also THOMAS K. MCCRAW, THE
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ideal of America as an agrarian economy financed by small local banks
and minimally overseen by small local government, Alexander Hamilton
saw the young American nation’s power in the future as riding on
technical and financial prowess.10 To Hamilton, a politically and
economically independent American Republic required an “energetic”—
not “imbecilic”—government, a well-developed system of finance, and a
well-diversified productive capacity.11 By fully articulating the intimate
connection among these three elements, Hamilton effectively envisaged
the United States as the first developmental state—with the emerging
qualities of a developmental finance state.12
At the heart of Hamilton’s development strategy was the creation of a
strong public-private system of finance that would, on the one hand,
underwrite federal monetary control and credit expansion and, on the other
hand, aggregate and channel vital resources toward building American
industry and trade. Hamilton proceeded with this program in a series of
steps that fundamentally shaped the modern American economy. Pursuant
to his program, the new national government assumed all of the separate
States’ revolutionary war debts and securitized them by issuing US
Treasury instruments. To manage the emerging system of reliable national
money and credit, Hamilton designed and pushed for establishing the first
Bank of the United States (the “Bank”)—in effect, the nation’s first central
bank.13
FOUNDERS AND FINANCE: HOW HAMILTON, GALLATIN, AND OTHER IMMIGRANTS FORGED A NEW
ECONOMY (2012).
10. See sources cited supra note 9; see also Alexander Hamilton, Report on Public Credit, in
ALEXANDER HAMILTON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 531; Report on Manufactures, supra note 1;
Report on a National Bank, supra note 2. For more on Jefferson’s contrasting vision, see ELKINS &
MCKITRICK, supra note 9, at 195–208; see also LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION:
EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY (1978); DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL
ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA (1980).
11. See CHERNOW, supra note 9, at 1–6, 344–79; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 9, at 92–
132, 258–62; MCDONALD, supra note 9, at 117–210.
12. It is worth noting that there have been competing interpretations of Hamilton’s historical
legacy ever since the time of Hamilton himself. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 9. Some
progressives and “states’ rights” enthusiasts from Jefferson and Madison on down have demonized
him as a champion of moneyed interests or of autocratic government, while other progressives and
activist Republicans from Abraham Lincoln to Theodore Roosevelt have lionized him as a visionary
champion of federally-orchestrated beneficial change. See, e.g., Christian Parenti, Reading Hamilton
from the Left, JACOBIN (Aug. 26, 2014), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/08/reading-hamiltonfrom-the-left/ (discussing various ideological interpretations of Hamilton’s legacy). We do not purport
to resolve this century-old dispute here. Our point is simply to emphasize that the idea of using the
state as a tool to promote nation-wide economic change is as old and as American as the original
architecture of our federal government and financial system themselves. Thanks to Aziz Rana for
pressing us on this point.
13. See generally Report on a National Bank, supra note 2.
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Two aspects of Hamilton’s model of the Bank are particularly relevant
for our purposes. First, it was explicitly designed as a public-private joint
venture that “unite[d] public authority and faith with private credit.”14 The
Bank was initially capitalized at $10 million—an enormous sum at the
time—with subscriptions supplied by private parties and the federal
government.15 Although the government contributed 20% of the Bank’s
capital and accordingly held a minority equity stake,16 it played an active
role as the insider-guardian of the public interest.17 Second, the Bank
functioned in part as a national development bank. In this capacity, it
made targeted investments in various development projects, primarily
infrastructural in character.18 Hamilton thought private investors more
likely to make wise, economically sensible investment choices and,
accordingly, arranged for “private” directors on the Bank’s board to take
the lead role in its investment decision-making.19 The Bank’s “public”
directors, however, played a continuing oversight role even with respect to
these decisions, and, crucially, were to withdraw the federal subscription
from the Bank in the event that the private directors sought to make crony
or otherwise profligate-looking project investments over the public
directors’ objections.20 This further underscored the federal government’s
unique role as a “joint proprietor in th[e] undertaking.”21
14. Alexander Hamilton, To James Duane, in ALEXANDER HAMILTON: WRITINGS, supra note 1,
at 70, 83 [hereinafter Letter to James Duane]; see also Report on a National Bank, supra note 2, at 585
(emphasis added) (“[B]anks . . . enable honest and industrious men, of small or perhaps of no capital[,]
to undertake and prosecute business, with advantage to themselves and to the community . . . .”).
15. See Report on a National Bank, supra note 2, at 604. The $10-million initial capitalization
was several times the combined capital of all then-existing US banks. See CHERNOW, supra note 9, at
349.
16. See Report on a National Bank, supra note 2, at 608.
17. Hamilton explained these provisions through explicit reference to the fundamental public
interest in ensuring the properly prudent operation of the Bank:
If the paper of a Bank is to be permitted to insinuate itself into all the revenues and receipts of
a country; if it is even to be tolerated as the substitute for gold and silver, in all the
transactions of business, it becomes in either view a national concern of the first magnitude.
Report on a National Bank, supra note 2, at 603.
18. Hamilton was keenly aware of the critical role infrastructure played in a nation’s economy—
even when the latter was considered already well “developed.” See Report on Manufactures, supra
note 1, at 707 (“There is perhaps scarcely any thing, which has been better calculated to assist the
manufactures of Great Britain, than the ameliorations of the public roads of that Kingdom, and the
great progress which has been of late made in opening canals. Of the former, the United States stand
much in need; and for the latter they present uncommon facilities.”).
19. See Report on a National Bank, supra note 2, at 602; see also Letter to James Duane, supra
note 14, at 83 (“Paper credit never was long supported in any country, on a national scale, where it was
not founded on the joint basis of public and private credit.”).
20. See, e.g., MCDONALD, supra note 9, at 189–210. In this sense, the Bank operated somewhat
like a private equity fund whose “passive” partners in effect had a veto power because they were not
required to “lock up” funds for set periods of time. Aspects of this arrangement will figure in our
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The final element of Hamilton’s program—in addition to the creation
of a reliable national system of money and credit and the establishment of
a central bank—directly concerned state-promoted industrialization of the
United States. To this end, Hamilton planned yet another public-private
partnership of sorts, organized as a combined “development corporation”
and “enterprise zone.”22 This partnership took the form of an indirectly
federally-funded, New Jersey-chartered corporation named the Society for
Establishing Useful Manufactures (“S.U.M.”).23 The corporation was to be
initially capitalized through private subscriptions (with US Treasury
securities as paid-in capital); and its location between New York City and
Philadelphia gave it access both to abundant cheap water power and to
investors in the two largest financial centers of the day.24 The
corporation’s aim was to develop efficient means of manufacturing
various finished goods and to demonstrate the practicability and ready
imitability of such means to the nation at large.25 To Hamilton, this was a
project of actively creating what we now know as a Ricardian comparative
advantage, so as to render the nation not only juridically but also
practically sovereign and self-sufficient.26
Hamilton’s manufacturing plan was not fully completed in his lifetime.
Nevertheless, his ideas fundamentally determined America’s entire
developmental trajectory. Remarkably, Thomas Jefferson, Hamilton’s
chief antagonist while in office, pursued explicitly Hamiltonian policies
during his own presidential administration.27 In the early to mid-nineteenth
century, Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun’s “American System” was
proposals below. For more on the operations of modern private equity firms and their significance to
our project, see infra Part III.B.
21. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank, in ALEXANDER
HAMILTON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 613, 632; see also id. at 646 (noting that the government
would remain a “proprietor” and would “share in the profit, or loss, of the institution”).
22. See CHERNOW, supra note 9 at 370–79; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 9, at 258–62;
MCCRAW, supra note 9, at 122–36; MCDONALD, supra note 9, at 189–210.
23. See sources cited supra note 22.
24. See sources cited supra note 22. The town of Paterson that grew around it can be compared
to a modern-day technology cluster zone like Silicon Valley.
25. See Report on Manufactures, supra note 1.
26. See sources cited supra note 22.
27. Jefferson pursued these policies through his own Treasury Secretary—Albert Gallatin—who
began as a Hamilton antagonist in Congress, and ended up being arguably more Hamiltonian than even
Hamilton. See MCCRAW, supra note 9, at 179–328; RAYMOND WALTERS, JR., ALBERT GALLATIN:
JEFFERSONIAN FINANCIER AND DIPLOMAT 170–84 (1957); Carter Goodrich, The Gallatin Plan After
One Hundred and Fifty Years, 102 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 436, 436–41 (1958). See generally CARTER
GOODRICH, GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS AND RAILROADS 1800–1890 (1960)
(describing various political and ideological factors that shaped early US economic policies).
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Hamiltonian in inspiration and design.28 Later, Henry Carey, President
Lincoln’s chief economic advisor, also explicitly embraced the
Hamiltonian mantle.29 Finally, much of the most innovative governmental
development activity during the Progressive era, Roosevelt’s New Deal,
and the post-war Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, which
bequeathed many of the institutions that we discuss below, took a
straightforwardly Hamiltonian market-actor form.30
Furthermore, Hamilton’s vision of a proactive, modernizing state
deliberately altering the nation’s “natural” comparative advantage was the
original inspiration behind the best-known European and Asian economic
“miracles.”31 Friedrich List, the chief architect of Germany’s rapid
industrialization, built his program on Hamiltonian principles.32 In the late
nineteenth century, List’s, and hence Hamilton’s, programs were explicitly
adopted in Meiji Japan.33 From there, Hamiltonian ideas spread to South
Korea, Taiwan, and other late twentieth-century East Asian “tiger”
economies that often are equated with the very concept of a modern
developmental state.34
28. See generally GOODRICH, supra note 27; Michael J. Lacey, Federalism and National
Planning: The Nineteenth-Century Legacy, in THE AMERICAN PLANNING TRADITION: CULTURE AND
POLICY 89 (Robert Fishman ed., 2000); JOHN LAURITZ LARSON, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT: NATIONAL
PUBLIC WORKS AND THE PROMISE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE EARLY UNITED STATES (2001);
MICHAEL LIND, HAMILTON’S REPUBLIC: READINGS IN THE AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC NATIONALIST
TRADITION (1997); CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 1815–
1846 (1991).
29. For an exposition of Carey’s Hamiltonian views, see HENRY C. CAREY, THE HARMONY OF
INTERESTS: AGRICULTURAL, MANUFACTURING & COMMERCIAL (Augustus M. Kelley 1967) (1851)
(advocating the “American System” of developmental capitalism, in which government fosters
domestic industry and national self-sufficiency, in contrast to the “British System” of laissez faire
capitalism and free trade). See also PAUL K. CONKIN, PROPHETS OF PROSPERITY: AMERICA’S FIRST
POLITICAL ECONOMISTS (1980) (devoting last two chapters of the book to discussion of Carey’s
views).
30. For more on these later programs and their Hamiltonian forms, see Robert Hockett, A
Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means: Values, Constraints, and Finance in the Design of A
Comprehensive and Contemporary American “Ownership Society,” 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 99–124
(2005) [hereinafter A Jeffersonian Republic].
31. See generally HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2002); IAN PATRICK AUSTIN, COMMON FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN AND
EAST ASIAN MODERNISATION: FROM ALEXANDER HAMILTON TO JUNICHERO KOIZUMI (2009). See
also LIND, supra note 28, at 330–35.
32. List’s “National System” was even named in tandem with Clay’s and Calhoun’s “American
System.” See generally CHANG, supra note 31; FRIEDRICH LIST, THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY (Sampson S. Lloyd trans., Augustus M. Kelley 1966) (1885); William Notz,
Frederick List in America, 16 AM. ECON. REV. 249 (1926). See also AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 75–
106; LIND, supra note 28, at 330–35.
33. See, e.g., AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 261–318. See also LIND, supra note 28, at 330–35; PAUL
LINEBARGER ET AL., FAR EASTERN GOVERNMENTS AND POLITICS: CHINA AND JAPAN 326 (1954).
34. See AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 261–318; LINEBARGER ET AL., supra note 33, at 326; see also
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Tracing the lineage of the developmental state to Alexander Hamilton
reveals the deep irony behind America’s present self-image as a
genetically-encoded laissez-faire state. The rise of neoliberal economics
and free-market fundamentalism as the dominant American ideology
supplied a skewed historical and political narrative that deliberately
ignores Hamilton’s influence and the decisive role of the state in this
country’s industrial development. This narrative presents the American
economic model “as a page out of a neoclassical economics textbook,” an
unquestioned triumph of self-interested individuals acting rationally and
autonomously in self-adjusting markets.35 On this textbook page, the
government is generally portrayed as an external, extra-economic force
that imposes politically-derived—thus, presumptively “unnatural” and
potentially inefficient—constraints on the market. The government is
inherently incapable of entrepreneurship and innovation and, therefore,
should stay out of the way of private market actors who alone can generate
economic prosperity and human progress.36 In short, the neoliberal
doctrine draws a stark dividing line: governments act in the public,
political sphere, while markets constitute the private, economic sphere.
Even in this elegantly sterile neoliberal narrative, however, the divide
is not absolute, and the government is generally recognized as playing two
market-supporting roles. First, governments intervene in the markets
“from above” by imposing various legal and regulatory constraints on
private parties’ behavior to ensure order and civility, to prevent or limit
socially undesirable outcomes, or to set standards for socially desirable
ones. We call this a supervisory function.37 Second, governments help to
constitute markets “from below,” by supplying some of the basic rules of
the game—such as property and contract laws—necessary to enable
frictionless operation of private markets. We call this a constitutive
function.38 Two theoretical justifications are typically used to
accommodate these two forms of government interference in private
LIND, supra note 28, at 330–35; David Levi-Faur, Friedrich List and the Political Economy of the
Nation-State, 4 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 154 (1997).
35. Jonah D. Levy, Robert A. Kagan & John Zysman, The Twin Restorations: The Political
Economy of the Reagan and Thatcher “Revolutions,” in TEN PARADIGMS OF MARKET ECONOMIES
AND LAND SYSTEMS 4 (Lee-Jay Cho & Yoon Hyung Kim eds., 1998).
36. President Ronald Reagan’s famous quote sums up the basic sentiment behind this worldview:
“[G]overnment is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem.” Ronald W. Reagan,
President of the United States, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981), available at http://www.reagan
foundation.org/pdf/Inaugural_Address_012081.pdf.
37. Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, “Private” Means to “Public” Ends: Governments
as Market Actors, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 53, 55 (2014).
38. Id.
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markets: correcting specific market failures and providing specific public
goods.39
We argue that this dominant view of public-private, governmentmarket dynamics is both descriptively incomplete and normatively weak.
Descriptively, it overlooks a critically important third modality of
government action in the private economic sphere—that of an endogenous
market participant alongside its private partners and counterparties.
Normatively, it is incapable of offering a programmatic vision for utilizing
the government’s unique strengths to unlock private markets’ heretofore
unrecognized potential to generate greater public benefits.40
Along both of these dimensions, the dominant narrative is also
inconsistent with the fundamentally American tradition of a strong
developmental state financed through a mix of public and private means,
which goes back to Secretary Hamilton’s program. 41 By contrast, we see
our project as an attempt to reclaim and revive this part of the American
national heritage. In keeping with Hamilton’s original vision, our primary
focus is on the crucial interaction between an energetic government,
public-private finance, and continuous national development.
Of course, the dynamics of this interaction in the 21st century will be
different from what they were in 1790. In the context of today’s more
complex financial system, the mechanisms through which the state asserts
its market presence and exercises its market leadership will themselves be
more complex. In this Article, we aim to elucidate some of these publicprivate dynamics and to identify some of these state-market interaction
mechanisms, both as they currently operate and as they might be made to
operate in the future. This effort is not as grand or as imbued with
historical significance as was Hamilton’s nation-building project, but it
derives its inspiration from the same “moral ambition.”42
39. For a more detailed discussion of these phenomena, see infra Part II.
40. As Mariana Mazzucato argues in connection with the entrepreneurial leadership of the state
in technological innovation:
Providing such leadership, the State makes things happen that otherwise would not have. But
whether this role is justified given the characteristics of ‘public good’ and the role of
‘externalities’ (both critical to the market failure argument), or whether it is justified due to a
broader understanding of the State as a courageous actor in the economic system makes all
the difference. . . . Rather than analysing the State’s active role through its correction of
‘market failures’ (emphasized by many ‘progressive’ economists who rightly see many
failures), it is necessary to build a theory of the State’s role in shaping and creating markets
....
MAZZUCATO, supra note 7, at 7–8.
41. See supra notes 13–26 and accompanying text.
42. Michael Loriaux, The French Developmental State As Myth and Moral Ambition, in THE
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 235, 237 (Meredith Woo-Cumings ed., 1999) (arguing that development is
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B. The Developmental Finance State: Outlines of the Concept
1. Working Definition: Framing the Inquiry
Three propositions form the basis of our argument. First of all, we
assert the utmost significance of pursuing socio-economic development as
a continuous national project that does not end once a country is
sufficiently industrialized and modernized to be considered a “developed”
economy. Development is not a particular end-of-history state; it is an
inherently dynamic phenomenon. Development is a conscious pursuit of
qualitative (not merely quantitative) growth and adaptation to new
environments; it is an evolutionary process of national self-definition and
reinvention. In today’s world, any “developed” nation that does not strive
to develop risks losing its global competitive edge. In this sense, the
United States is a developing country, whether or not Americans realize or
admit it. We seek to re-introduce this critically important normative
concept into the public discourse.
Secondly, we view this conscious pursuit of national development as a
fundamentally public-private enterprise. As the ultimate public, collective
actor, the federal government is well-positioned to formulate a national
developmental strategy. But its successful implementation would require
the government to utilize, deliberately and systematically, its ability to
participate directly in private market transactions as an endogenous, rather
than merely exogenous, actor. Via this explicitly participatory marketactor modality, the government can lead the market from within—thus
becoming an integral part of the private market, altering some of the
market’s potentially undesirable internal dynamics, and empowering both
the market and the nation.
Finally, we deliberately focus on the use of financial techniques and
financial instruments as primary methods of the government’s pursuit of
developmental goals in its role as a market actor. Finance represents both
the lifeblood of the economy and “the nerves of the state”—it is the
principal link connecting the state and the market.43 Finance is a universal
productive input; it can be easily moved and re-deployed for a multitude
of purposes.44 Moreover, the increasing financialization of the American
fundamentally a nation’s “moral ambition” and an aspiration to develop rather than a specific set of
policies).
43. Meredith Woo-Cumings, Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism
and Development, in THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE, supra note 42, at 10 (quoting Jean Bodin).
44. See ZYSMAN, supra note 5, at 76–77 (discussing the “universality” of finance as a policy
tool).
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economy in recent decades makes finance a particularly potent lever of
economic and political power. Therefore, we view financial markets as the
strategic arena in which America’s future developmental trajectory will be
decided.
These three elements, inspired by and building upon Hamiltonian
ideas, define the contours of what we tentatively call here a developmental
finance state model. A “developmental finance state” can be defined as a
state that pursues specific developmental goals through direct participation
in private financial markets as an endogenous market actor.
Far from being a fully theorized construct, this working definition is
merely a starting point in our inquiry into the nature of this complex
phenomenon. Two basic questions frame this inquiry: What does this
model look like in reality? And what could it look like if we had a better
understanding of its transformative potential?
2. Descriptive Aspect: Developing a Taxonomy
Our focus is on government instrumentalities—public actors—that
engage in typical forms of financial transactions in private markets as
buyers, sellers, lenders, borrowers, and insurers. Yet, because they are
public instrumentalities, their seemingly ordinary commercial activities
can, and often do, have uniquely profound effects on the markets in which
they operate. First of all, the government is a very big actor, potentially
able to command enormous financial resources on the strength of its full
faith and credit. Its size and significant funding advantages allow the
government to affect the market much more forcefully than any individual
private actor. Secondly, even as a market actor, the government is not
driven—and thus constrained—by purely pecuniary motives. Government
instrumentalities typically participate in private markets to achieve some
public goal; they are not motivated by a single-minded pursuit of private
gain. This fundamental difference enables public entities to counteract
certain cumulatively irrational effects of private parties’ individually
rational short-term profit-seeking actions. In that sense, government
instrumentalities are uniquely well-positioned to perform the critically
important role of market contrarians. Finally, the government can use its
regulatory powers to support and facilitate the fulfillment of its market
objectives.45
45. Adam Levitin and Susan Wachter provide a thoughtful case study of direct government
participation in the US housing finance market as a regulatory modality, which they call “public
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This political side of the government, however, is also the perennial
source of suspicion that accompanies state participation in economic
activity. The main reasons for concern are well-known: we fear that the
state will abuse its power to coerce; we worry that state bureaucrats may
lack the expertise to carry out their proclaimed goals; we doubt that they
are able to resist political pressure or the corrupting influence of money.
These concerns are legitimate, but they tend to obscure the positive,
constructive potential of the government’s role as a market-actor.46
To elucidate this under-appreciated transformative potential, we
develop a provisional taxonomy of the functions currently performed by
various government instrumentalities directly participating in private
financial markets. We identify and discuss four categories of such
functions: market-making, market-moving, market-levering, and marketpreserving.47 Together, these four aspects of the government-as-marketactor modality can be viewed as constituting the current prototype of the
modern American developmental finance state.
The “market-making” category encompasses those instances in which a
government instrumentality assumes risks that private actors usually are
unable or unwilling to bear and, by doing so, either establishes or directly
and substantially facilitates the emergence of a particular publicly
beneficial market. In this role, public actors actively create the space for
previously non-existent, or only incipient, private exchange.
The “market-moving” category refers to instances in which
government action affects certain market prices to produce public benefits
that profit-driven private parties ordinarily are not motivated to produce.
In this role, public actors guide private markets by altering price signals in
a manner that counteracts such markets’ tendency to under-supply publicly
beneficial outcomes.
The “market-levering” category includes various forms of government
action expanding, amplifying, or optimizing the functioning of existing
option” regulation. See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, The Public Option in Housing Finance,
46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1111 (2013) [hereinafter Public Option].
46. In large part due to the dominance of neoliberal, market-fundamentalist ideology in US
policy discourse in recent decades, the existing popular and academic literature criticizing the
government for everything it does or does not do is simply too voluminous to cite here. For a recent
example of a sweepingly critical take on government action, see PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY
GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN: AND HOW IT CAN DO BETTER (2014). Our goal in this Article is not
to refute these well-worn criticisms but to highlight what they either ignore or significantly understate:
the fact that the government, despite its internally fragmented structure and complex dynamics,
remains the most powerful tool of pursuing public interests in private markets.
47. See infra Part II.
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private markets. In this role, public actors magnify private markets and
boost their potential to produce public benefits.
Finally, the “market-preserving” category denotes a range of
government actions—typically temporary and undertaken only in
emergency situations—that prevent the collapse of a previously selfsustaining private market. In this role, public actors act as the ultimate
market contrarians: they save a private market by halting its inherent selfdestructive dynamics, in order to avoid a greater public harm.
The definitional boundaries within our proposed taxonomy of public
roles in private markets are inherently fluid. The four categories we
identify are not mutually exclusive, nor are they hard and fast. Any one of
these roles can be, and often is, employed as a means of discharging the
functions of one or more of the others in particular circumstances. In
practice, it may be impossible to find a pure form of a particular
government-as-market-actor role, as presented in our taxonomy.
Nevertheless, categorizing and distinguishing these functions is a helpful
analytical and expository tool that, on the one hand, helps to sharpen and
enrich our understanding of the underlying logic and significance of past
and present actions by government actors in private markets and, on the
other hand, enables us to envisage future uses of public actors’ market
power for public ends. This taxonomy of functions, however fluid and
intertwined, provides a vocabulary for a bolder and more pro-active
approach to policy-making.48
Our provisional taxonomy of government roles in private markets is by
no means exhaustive or all-encompassing, either theoretically or
descriptively.49 There are many ways in which public actors—government
bureaucracies and quasi-government entities—intervene or participate in
private market exchanges. For example, governments routinely act as
buyers, sellers, lenders, and borrowers in numerous market transactions. In
terms of what any particular government actor does in each such “normal”
market exchange (e.g., buying or selling services or goods), its actions
48. See MAZZUCATO, supra note 7, at 8 (“[W]e must start using new words to describe the
State.”).
49. For example, sociologist Fred Block has developed a taxonomy of governmental roles in the
markets for new technologies. According to Block, the US federal government directly shapes
developmental outcomes in the high-tech sector by performing four overlapping functions: targeted
resourcing, opening windows, business and technological brokering, and facilitating. Block, supra
note 7, at 172–74. In each role, the government works directly and proactively with private firms and
scientists to identify, fund, and nurture potentially promising technological innovations that private
investors consider too risky. While reflecting the distinctive dynamics of the knowledge-based hightech sector, Block’s notion of a “developmental network state” is parallel to, and shares many
fundamental similarities with, our concept of a developmental finance state. Id. (emphasis added).
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may appear indistinguishable from those we label as forms of marketmaking or market-moving. Yet, for purposes of our discussion, it is
important to draw a conceptual boundary between instances in which the
government acts primarily in its capacity as a consumer or provider of
specific services or goods, on the one hand, and instances in which the
same government’s primary intent in entering into a market transaction is
to make, move, lever, or preserve the target market, on the other hand.
That is why our taxonomy of market-actor roles generally excludes
such ubiquitous phenomena as government procurement and public
utilities. Undoubtedly, the government may be the sole or the largest
consumer of particular goods or services (e.g., in the market for military
airplanes or submarines manufactured by private firms) who effectively
creates and moves prices in the market. Yet, typically, any such market
effect is merely collateral, an unpremeditated result rather than the primary
purpose of the action intended to satisfy a particular need of the
government qua government (e.g., as the monopoly provider of national
military defense). Only where the relevant government actor consciously
uses these second-order market effects to influence behavior of private
counterparties outside the context of the primary transaction does it
potentially assume an explicit market-actor role within the meaning of our
taxonomy.50
Similarly, the mere fact of public ownership of an economic enterprise
does not automatically render the government a market-actor within the
meaning of our argument. Thus, public utilities may compete with private
providers and, in that sense, act as “normal” market participants. Yet, their
primary purpose may not extend as far as market-moving or marketlevering, nor may they necessarily be able to exert sufficient market power
to move the entire market in a particular way. Only to the extent public
enterprise is deliberately used as a vehicle for causing an endogenous
public-benefitting change in private markets can it be said to play a
market-actor role.
The principal purpose of our taxonomy-building exercise is to uncover
the face of the American developmental finance state, as it currently
exists. It routinely performs various market-actor roles that are
50. One well-known example of this type of government action was the decision of the US Navy
to switch from coal to oil as the source of fuel for its military ships in the early twentieth century. In
that case, government procurement fundamentally changed, in a specifically intended manner, not only
the market for military fuel but also the broader US energy market. See Richard Rhodes, How Oil
Became King, HISTORY TODAY, Aug. 2012, available at http://www.historytoday.com/richardrhodes/how-oil-became-king; Petroleum and Sea Power, AM. OIL & GAS HISTORICAL SOC’Y,
http://aoghs.org/petroleum-in-war/petroleum-and-sea-power/ (last visited June 28, 2015).
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simultaneously extremely familiar and fundamentally under-appreciated,
in large part because of the lack of an effective conceptual apparatus for
explaining their overall significance. In that sense, the modern American
developmental finance state is “hidden” in plain sight.51 Our taxonomy
seeks to remedy this handicap.
3. Prescriptive Aspect: Testing the Outer Limits
Perhaps more importantly, our taxonomy of government-as-marketactor roles provides a conceptual framework for envisioning potential
extensions of the identified modalities beyond their current forms. Inspired
by the Hamiltonian vision, we advocate for a normatively emboldened and
operationally expanded exercise of the government’s power as a market
actor. We argue that the normative justification for the government’s
action in private markets should go well beyond the traditional marketfailure and public-goods arguments. Instead of acting only to correct
specific instances of market failure (including the under-provision of
traditional public goods), government instrumentalities should make a
more strategic use of their unique ability to harness, from within, the
power of private markets for the purpose of shaping and promoting the
long-term development of the national economy.52
Historical experience shows, however, that defining substantive goals
and criteria of national development is an inherently complex, contextspecific, and deeply contested process.53 In our public discourse, economic
issues are generally not framed in terms of development or developmental
policy, as if these concerns should be reserved only for the less developed,
economically “backward” countries.54 In the current US climate of
extreme political and economic polarization, moreover, any attempt to
51. We borrow this term from Fred Block. See Block, supra note 7, at 170.
52. Writing about the government’s central role in promoting scientific research and
development, economist Mariana Mazzucato similarly argues that the traditional “market failure”
framework cannot explain the state’s “visionary” strategic investments in transformative technologies.
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 7, at 21–22 (“Indeed, the discovery of the Internet or the emergence of
the nanotechnology industry did not occur because the private sector wanted something but could not
find the resources to invest in it. Both happened due to the vision that the government had in an area
that had not yet been fathomed by the private sector . . . . It was—in these and many such cases—the
State that appeared to have the most aggressive ‘animal spirits.’”).
53. There is a rich body of literature analyzing and evaluating various historical experiences with
formulation and implementation of developmental strategies that inevitably have important
distributional consequences. See generally sources cited supra note 4.
54. See generally ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE (1962) (discussing industrialization and economic development in “backward”
countries).
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design a national development policy is likely to generate particularly
bitter conflicts. This Article does not purport to offer a particular template
for such a policy or to advocate a specific plan for long-term national
development. For our purposes, it is sufficient to emphasize that any
successful strategy of national development must aim at ensuring
sustainable long-term economic growth, creating a more stable and
structurally-balanced economy, maintaining full employment, and
achieving higher levels of socio-economic inclusion and cohesion.55 Freemarket exchange may be the best mechanism for promoting the innovation
and entrepreneurship indispensable to economic growth but, contrary to
market apologists’ claims, it does not automatically generate sustainable,
socially inclusive modes of national development. Even at a high level of
generalization, it is clear that some of the broad developmental goals
outlined above will often clash with the single-minded pursuit of private
profit by self-interested individuals. In that sense, ongoing national
development is the ultimate public good that private actors under-provide.
It embodies a normative vision of the nation’s future that seeks to balance
various competing social and economic goals—a fundamentally political
exercise.56
The difficulty of this exercise, however, should not preclude us from
advocating the need for it. Nor should it discourage us from making at
least a preliminary attempt to envisage some of the elements of a
potentially workable developmental strategy. Delineating a few discrete
measures may help to fill this abstract notion with a more concrete
meaning—and suggest the general direction in which the American
developmental finance state can potentially evolve.
55. Despite their generality and potential contestability, these broadly stated goals serve as
important signposts marking the conceptual boundary separating development as a bona fide national
project from other, narrower, and often misleading, formulations. An example of the latter is the
current preoccupation with US “global competitiveness” that is erroneously equated with continuous
deregulation and lower taxation of private businesses. This one-sided version of global
competitiveness cannot serve as a proxy or a substitute for a program of national development.
Development cannot and should not be equated with rising corporate profits or stock market prices;
nor can it be measured solely in terms of GDP or similar output metrics. Financialization, outsourcing
of domestic jobs, decline of entire sectors of the economy and geographic regions, increasing
inequality, stagnant wages and mounting consumer debt—these are some of the factors that must also
be given significant weight in the deliberations on the US developmental trajectory.
56. It is worth re-emphasizing here that we view a developmental finance state as a mechanism, a
tool for achieving substantive policy goals—but the content and the desired socio-economic impact of
such policies should be determined through political deliberation. The degree of real-life success (or
failure) of the developmental finance state depends on these fundamentally political choices that,
among other things, raise questions of democratic legitimacy and distributive justice. An examination
of these complex factors is beyond the scope of this Article.
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We outline three potential extensions of public instrumentalities’
traditional market-making, market-moving, market-levering, and marketpreserving functions: (1) adoption of a broad asset-price stability
maintenance program; (2) establishment of a public-private national
infrastructure-funding vehicle; and (3) creation of a special government
share in privately owned financial institutions.57 These proposals are likely
to generate many questions we are not able to answer in this Article. Some
may view them as an unacceptably radical departure from the existing
economic and political “norm.” As discussed earlier, this perception may,
at least in part, reflect a skewed understanding of what the American
“norm” really is. Rather than providing a complete blueprint for action,
our primary goal is to conduct a thought experiment: to envisage what a
developmental finance state might look like in a 21st-century America that
fully embraces its Hamiltonian heritage.
II. PUBLIC ACTORS AS PARTICIPANTS IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: A
TAXONOMY OF ROLES
As discussed above, our notion of a developmental finance state is
based on an explicit recognition of the fact that states and markets are not
“separate but equal”—they are inseparable and deeply interconnected parts
of the nation’s economic organism. Governments not only intervene in
private economic activities from outside; they also directly conduct such
activities as a means of achieving public policy goals. As a descriptive
matter, this endogenous public participation in private markets in pursuit
of explicitly public ends may take a wide variety of specific forms. For
analytical purposes, we divide the universe of such forms into four main
groups: “market-making,” “market-moving,” “market-levering,” and
“market-preserving.”58 This Part elaborates on each of these four
archetypal roles that public actors play when they act as direct financial
market participants.
A. Market-Making
Markets require counterparties willing and able to enter into an
exchange. That trivial truth carries important implications for the very
possibility of markets. It can be costly, for example, to “take one’s goods
57. See infra Part III.
58. The discussion in this Part draws and expands on our earlier exploratory essay. See Hockett
& Omarova, supra note 37.
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to market.” A prospective seller’s decision to participate in a market
exchange depends fundamentally on that person’s expectation that
(1) there will be people at a particular location who (2) desire what he or
she is ready to sell and (3) are able to pay for the desired items with other
goods, services, or currencies that the seller is prepared to accept. If a
potential seller does not know in advance that all of these conditions are
likely to be met, he or she might not “go to the market.” Even if, in fact,
there are willing and able prospective buyers for this hypothetical seller’s
goods, the seller’s lack of knowledge of, or belief in, their availability will
prevent a mutually beneficial exchange from taking place.
Functionally, market-making seeks to avoid this potentially wasteful
outcome. The market-maker helps to create and maintain market exchange
of specific assets—goods, services, financial instruments—by ensuring the
continuous availability of, and thereby inducing confidence in, prospective
counterparties to every trade. To fulfill this function, the market-maker
agrees to bear two complementary types of risk. One is the risk that the
product in question does not actually sell. The market-maker assumes this
risk by agreeing to serve as something akin to a “buyer of last resort.” In
doing this, he or she engages in a form of underwriting—in this case,
underwriting of a prospective seller’s risk. On the flipside, the marketmaker also assumes prospective buyers’ risk that there might not be
adequate supplies of the product they wish to purchase in the market. The
market-maker assumes this risk by maintaining inventories of, or access
to, the product in question, and committing to sell units of the item to
anyone willing to pay a predetermined price. Thus, by assuming both the
sellers’ and the buyers’ risks, the market-maker averts the tragedy of
needlessly missed opportunities for socially beneficial exchanges of goods
and services.
Perhaps the most readily recognizable form of the market-maker role
exists in stock markets where designated professional intermediaries
“make markets” in a particular security. Market-makers agree to do two
things: (1) to purchase particular securities from anyone offering them at a
stipulated “ask” price; and (2) to sell the same securities to anyone at a
stipulated “bid” price. The difference between the bid and ask prices—the
spread—is the market-maker’s compensation for the two-way risk it
assumes by making these promises to all other market participants. In a
normally-functioning, sufficiently liquid market, the market-maker may be
able to manage its risks and generate sizeable profits. However, a
significant market turbulence—when either prospective buyers or
prospective sellers of particular securities unilaterally flee or, conversely,
flood the market—may put the market-maker’s continuing ability to stand
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by its promise to buy and sell those securities to a harsh and potentially
fatal test.
Given the risks inherent in the role of a market-maker, especially in
financial instruments notoriously prone to dramatic and sudden price
fluctuations, it is not surprising that market-makers have traditionally been
“big” market actors endowed with substantial resources.59 In many
instances, public instrumentalities have had to perform the market-making
role, as private actors retreated from this unacceptably risky activity.60
Although market-making is not an inherently governmental function,
there are important reasons to believe that public instrumentalities
(including, but not limited to, central banks) are particularly well-suited to
perform that role. Thus, to the extent that market-making represents a
canonical public good, it is inherently prone to under-provision by private
actors, especially in times of market stress.61 Public instrumentalities, on
the other hand, are instituted specifically to provide public goods. They are
well-resourced and, as government actors, often able to tap into potentially
significant additional financial capacity. Importantly, public
instrumentalities are not driven by purely profit-making motives. In
contrast to private market-makers, public entities’ primary motivation is
fundamentally aligned with the public interest in maintaining a healthy
market. Freedom from the harsh dictates of short-term profit-generation
and loss-avoidance enables public actors to continuously make markets,
even in the face of deteriorating market conditions.
Several cases help to illustrate the importance of the government-asmarket-maker role in modern finance. The most conspicuous recent case is
the role played by the Federal Reserve and the US Treasury as “market59. One well-known example of an individual actor sometimes said to have been capable of
performing the role of a heroic market-maker in the early twentieth century was John Pierpont
Morgan. For an illuminating popular account of the role that Morgan played as a sort of private
provider of public goods in the financial markets, particularly prior to the passage of the Federal
Reserve Act in 1913, see RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN (2d ed. 2010); see also JEAN
STROUSE, MORGAN: AMERICAN FINANCIER (1999). It should be noted that Morgan’s role as savior of
the American financial system might have been exaggerated, especially in light of the government’s
market-preserving efforts during the 1907 crisis. See, e.g., PETER CONTI-BROWN, ULYSSES AND THE
CHAPERONE: THE INDEPENDENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND GOVERNANCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
(forthcoming 2015).
60. For informative accounts of how the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have recently
and historically played such roles, see PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED
BECAME THE DEALER OF LAST RESORT (2011); Gerard Hertig, Governments as Investors of Last
Resort: Comparative Credit Crisis Case-Studies, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 385 (2012).
61. For more on the familiar categories of market failure and public goods, see Francis M. Bator,
The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. ECON. 351 (1958); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of
Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954). For more on market incompleteness, see 1
MICHAEL MAGILL & MARTINE QUINZII, THEORY OF INCOMPLETE MARKETS (1996).
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makers of last resort” during the worst of the 2008–2009 financial market
crisis. The Federal Reserve established a number of dedicated emergency
facilities specifically for that purpose.62 Treasury played its market-maker
role through the legislatively authorized Troubled Asset Relief Program
(“TARP”).63 The primary objective of these special facilities was to stave
off a rapid panic-induced decline in the market price of certain financial
assets—such as asset-backed securities (“ABSs”) and collateralized debt
obligations (“CDOs”)—below what fundamentals appeared to warrant.64
The Federal Reserve and Treasury publicly committed to purchase any
such assets whose prices fell below a specified floor—that is, assets too
toxic for any private buyers to touch.65 By standing ready, in the midst of
an unfolding crisis, to buy the worst of the troubled financial assets and to
absorb the immediate loss of value, the Federal Reserve and the US
Treasury, in effect, became the market for such assets.66
According to official reports, the government entities involved in these
asset-purchase programs ultimately turned profits when, several years
later, they sold off the purchased assets.67 Although not entirely free of
controversy, that outcome confirmed the government’s original judgment
that panic conditions had been the primary cause of severe undervaluations of the relevant financial assets by private market participants.
More importantly for the purposes of our argument, it vindicated the
62. Perhaps the best known special facility of this kind was the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York’s “Maiden Lane Fund” operations. See Maiden Lane Transactions, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
N.Y., http://newyorkfed.org/markets/maidenlane.html (last visited June 28, 2015).
63. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 26 U.S.C.). For an official overview of the
Credit Market Program under TARP, see Credit Market Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/credit-market-programs/Pages/
default.aspx (last updated Aug. 13, 2015).
64. For a more detailed explanation of the specific mechanisms of this contagious and
prophetically self-amplifying drop in value across entire classes of financial assets, see GARY B.
GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 (2010).
65. See, e.g., Maya Jackson Randall & Michael R. Crittenden, Treasury Unveils Toxic-Asset
Plan, Citing ‘Acute Pressure’ on Banks, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2009, 2:56 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB123780994825213465; What Are the Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset Purchases?, BD.
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/what-are-the-federalreserves-large-scale-asset-purchases.htm (last updated Oct. 28, 2015); see also Jose Gabilondo,
Financial Hospitals: Defending the Fed’s Role as a Market Maker of Last Resort, 36 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 731, 737–38 (2013) (arguing that the Federal Reserve has effectively constructed markets in
moribund assets).
66. See Gabilondo, supra note 65.
67. According to the U.S. Treasury, as of September 2015, “cumulative collections under TARP,
together with Treasury’s additional proceeds from the sale of non-TARP shares of AIG, exceed[ed]
total disbursements by more than $12 billion.” TARP Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/Pages/default.aspx (last updated
Oct. 14, 2015).
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proposition that market-making can prevent transitory liquidity crises from
morphing into avoidable—hence, classically “tragic”—permanent
solvency crises. In this sense, the US government entities’ direct marketmaking role doubled as a justifiable market-preserving role, discussed
below.68
Indeed, this type of last-resort market-making, which could only be
conducted by government entities, functioned as a substitute for, and an
extension of, the classic last-resort lending role originally articulated by
Walter Bagehot in describing Bank of England operations during the
nineteenth century.69 This evolution of central banks’ traditional liquidity
back-up function reflects and underscores a fundamental evolution in
modern financial markets. Today’s markets for capital are significantly
disintermediated, so that lending is securitized to a much more significant
degree than it was in Bagehot’s day.70 That explains why, in the twentyfirst century, directly buying and selling financial instruments may be a
more effective—perhaps even inevitable—method of government marketaiding intervention than the more familiar technique of extending
emergency loans to banks.71
Government’s role as a direct market-maker, however, is not confined
to relatively short-lived emergency situations. A good example of public
entities’ long-term market-making role is the creation and maintenance of
secondary markets in certain debt instruments—home mortgages and
student loans—by government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”). The
securitization of home mortgage lending in the United States effectively
began circa 1938, with the establishment of the first-ever large-scale
mortgage loan purchaser, the Federal National Mortgage Association
(“Fannie Mae”).72 The ultimate purpose served by this pioneering
government program, instituted in the midst of the Great Depression, was
to make home mortgage lending more attractive to banking institutions by
68. See infra Part II.D.
69. See WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET viii–ix,
27, 255–57 (John Wiley & Sons 1999) (1873); see generally MEHRLING, supra note 60 (describing the
role of a “lender of last resort”).
70. For a basic definition of disintermediation, see DAVID L. SCOTT, WALL STREET WORDS: AN
A TO Z GUIDE TO INVESTMENT TERMS FOR TODAY’S INVESTOR (2003).
71. For a recent discussion of the modern central banks’ role as lenders of last resort, see Paul
Tucker, The Lender of Last Resort and Modern Central Banking: Principles and Reconstruction, 79
BIS PAPERS 10 (2014), available at http://www.igmchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TuckerP-2014-LOLR-and-modern-central-banking-BIS-Papers-No-79.pdf.
72. For more on securitization, see Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The
Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553 (2008); Jonathan C. Lipson,
Re: Defining Securitization, 85 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1229 (2012).
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establishing a secondary market in which private banks unwilling to keep
home loans on their balance sheets could quickly sell those loans
(provided that the loans were of sufficiently high quality).73 That would, in
turn, lower the cost of home mortgage credit in the primary markets,
ultimately jumpstarting the Depression-struck building industry in the
short term and fostering broader, more stable home-ownership in the long
term.74
Until the 1990s, this system worked well, boosting the domestic
employment-inducing construction industry and converting the United
States from a nation in which 46% of households owned their own homes
to one in which nearly 20% more than that did.75 Fannie Mae was so
successful that, by the 1960s, it could be privatized, with the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) and Government
National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”) established to act as its
competitors.76 In recent decades, however, this market became
increasingly dysfunctional. A discussion of the numerous factors that
contributed to the unhealthy dynamics and ultimate implosion of the US
mortgage market in 2008 is beyond the scope of this Article.77 For
purposes of our argument, it is worth emphasizing that a critical factor in
this respect was the massive inflow in the 1990s to the early 2000s of new
types of unregulated or lightly regulated private market players—mortgage
lenders and securitizers—aggressively pursuing speculative short-term
73. For an overview of the history and functions of Fannie Mae and other GSEs, see generally
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CONG. OF THE UNITED STATES, FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC, AND THE
FEDERAL ROLE IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET (2010); TIMOTHY HOWARD, THE
MORTGAGE WARS: INSIDE FANNIE MAE, BIG-MONEY POLITICS, AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE
AMERICAN DREAM (2013); see also A Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 30, at 104–20. It should be
noted that accounts differ on the question of whether the ultimate purposes that Fannie Mae came to
serve were foreseen and intended from the outset, or only came to be fully appreciated later, after it
had been established as an ad hoc response to a temporary exigency. For the more purposeful
interpretation, see id. and sources cited therein. For a more “stumbled into it” account, see Public
Option, supra note 45.
74. For more on this history, see A Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 30, at 104–20; see also
David Min, How Government Guarantees Promote Housing Finance Stability, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
437 (2013) (examining the evolution of the US housing finance system).
75. See supra note 74. As noted in A Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 30, at 116–17, the figure
had reached 63% by 1970. The peak was nearly 70% in 2004, while the 50-year average to now has
been a bit over 65%. See, e.g., Diana Olick, Homeownership Rate Drops to 63.4%, Lowest Since 1967,
CNBC (July 28, 2015, 10:36 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/28/.
76. For a fuller account of this history, see FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 38–45 (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT].
77. For an insightful analysis of these dysfunctions, see Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter,
Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177 (2012).
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profits to the detriment of mortgage loan quality.78 Their originate-todistribute model of mortgage lending was designed to exploit the presence
of the still mammoth and implicitly publicly-backed GSEs.79 Ironically, as
privately-owned corporations, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac proved unable
to resist market pressure to join in the subprime mortgage game that
eventually forced both of them into conservatorship.80
The key point for our purposes is not so much the recent failure of
privatized GSEs but the undeniable success of the publicly-created
secondary market in home loans over a long span of several decades after
its creation. This model of public market-making was also expressly
embraced as the blueprint for US federal higher education finance policy.
Created in the early 1970s, the SLM Corporation (“Sallie Mae”) is a GSE
that makes a secondary market in student loans.81 In direct parallel to
Fannie Mae’s experience, the fully publicly-owned Sallie Mae greatly
increased Americans’ access to higher education—while, since Sallie
Mae’s privatization in 2005, matters have taken a more ominous turn.82
This brief overview of public instrumentalities’ market-making
activities also highlights the special significance of government-induced
standardization of market products and practices—a form of what we call
market-levering, discussed below—in facilitating the task of market78. Unregulated mortgage lenders filled the vacuum left by the collapse of the savings-and-loan
industry in the late 1980s. Similarly, private securitizers filled the market void when the accounting
scandals of the early 2000s forced Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to scale back their operations. See
FCIC REPORT, supra note 76, at 102–26; see also Robert Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, 87
WASH. U. L. REV. 1213, 1255–62 (2010) [hereinafter A Fixer-Upper for Finance].
79. Pursuant to the “originate-to-distribute” model, mortgage lenders extended loans to homebuyers not with a view to holding the loans in their portfolios and collecting monthly mortgage
payments thereafter, but with a view to selling the loans and associated payment-receipt rights to
secondary investors. This practice, which grew rapidly over the course of the 1990s, rendered
mortgage credit less expensive to homebuyers, but also rendered ultimate creditors more vulnerable to
failures of due diligence on the part of loan originators. See, e.g., Michael Simkovic, Competition and
Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, 88 IND. L.J. 213 (2013) (arguing that the massive entry of privatelabel mortgage securitizers in the mid-2000s led to dramatic deterioration in underwriting standards
and thus created perverse incentives for loan originators).
80. There is a plausible argument that privatizing the GSEs introduced a potentially fatal internal
contradiction in their design as market-makers by fundamentally re-orienting them toward pursuit of
private shareholder profits. See Public Option, supra note 45, at 1119. For a more general discussion
of the positive and negative effects of delegating public functions to private actors, see FINANCIAL
GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2006);
Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV.
813 (2000).
81. For more on Sallie Mae, see History, SALLIEMAE, https://www.salliemae.com/about/whowe-are/history/ (last visited July 6, 2015).
82. See ROBERT HOCKETT & RICHARD VAGUE, DEBT, DEFLATION, AND DEBACLE: OF PRIVATE
DEBT WRITE-DOWN AND PUBLIC RECOVERY (2013), available at http://www.interdependence.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/04/Debt-Deflation-and-Debacle-RV-and-RH1.pdf.
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making.83 For example, one factor that enabled the development of
secondary markets in both home and student loans was the government
guarantee of primary market debt. In the case of housing finance, this has
taken the form of mortgage default insurance provided by the Federal
Housing Administration (“FHA”) since 1934.84 In the case of higher
education finance, it has taken the form of express government guarantees
of student loans since the late 1950s. As described below, these public
guarantees levered primary markets into secondary markets, in great part,
via the product standardization effect of conditioning the guarantee on
specific eligibility criteria.85 This example illustrates how individual
market-actor roles identified in our taxonomy, in practice, may facilitate
one another and constitute an integrated strategy.
B. Market-Moving
The ideal of the free, competitive private market rests on a fundamental
assumption that no single market participant—acting either as a buyer or
as a seller—is able to exercise sufficient power to move the price of a
particular good. Individual market actors are meant to lack market power
and act as “price-takers,” not “price-makers:” they are meant to pay what
the market requires and sell what the market will bear at the market
price.86 The notorious hand that governs the market is invisible only to the
extent that no private market actor can single-handedly move it.
Implicit in this idealized picture is the view of the private market as an
inherently democratic and distributively just form of value determination.
Assuming rough equality of bargaining power—hence, of initial
endowments—among participants, the price outputs of markets in which
everyone is a price-taker can jointly constitute a “social cost” metric
derived by just, democratic means. The price of an apple in terms of
oranges under conditions of market equality will reflect both the
comparative bounty of objective nature in respect of apples and oranges,
and the comparative valuation of apples and oranges by subjective
83. See infra Part II.C.
84. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/fhahistory (last visited June 28,
2015); see also A Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 30, at 110–13; Public Option, supra note 45, at
1137–42.
85. See infra Part II.C.
86. For more on this ideal, see Robert Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution: A MetaTheory of Justice, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1179 (2005); Robert Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which
Society?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2005).
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individuals whose voluntary expenditure votes all count equally in
determining relative prices.87
Although real-life markets depart from this picture, it is easy to
appreciate both the attraction of the picture as an ideal and the sense in
which market-moving capacity held by an individual, or a group of
colluding individuals, might offend it. To use an extreme example, if one
person accumulates control over half of the world’s wealth and develops
an eccentric taste for apples, his concentrated use of purchasing power in
the apple market will distort the price of apples for everyone else. A single
powerful individual, in effect, will disturb the proper order of things
envisioned in the competitive market ideal by forcing us to subsidize
satisfaction of his eccentric taste via the higher price we all pay for apples.
Things look even worse if that same super-rich person employs his
extraordinary market power, not because he craves apples, but because he
seeks to influence the price of apples in order to manipulate prices of other
goods or services in a way that increases the profitability of his operations
in such related markets.88 Fundamentally, market-moving actions of this
sort appear suspect because they offend the democratic values from which
we derive the competitive market ideal.
However, market-moving can also serve public, not narrowly private,
purposes and provide socially-beneficial solutions to specific collective
action problems plaguing the market. Indeed, government
instrumentalities routinely engage in various forms of market-moving.
Perhaps the most familiar example of such routine market-moving in
modern financial markets is that of the so-called open market operations
(“OMO”) in which central banks or monetary authorities purchase or sell
government debt securities.89 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(“FRBNY”) conducts active open market operations by trading, on a daily
basis, US Treasury bonds—the federal government’s debt backed by the
87. This is the ethical intuition behind so-called Equal Division Walrasian Equilibria (“EDWE”),
as these figure into the work of some thoughtful egalitarian economists and justice theorists. See
generally Robert Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously (Cornell Law Sch., Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 08-004, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1108217;
Robert Hockett & Mathias Risse, Primary Goods Revisited: The “Political Problem” and Its Rawlsian
Solution (Cornell Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-030, 2003), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=931048.
88. An analogy can be drawn between this folksy hypothetical and an actual possibility that some
financial institutions might trade physical commodities to bend yield curves in commodity derivative
markets in which the same institutions also hold positions. See Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of
Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 347–49 (2013).
89. See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 37, at 65.
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full faith and credit of the United States.90 Through massive purchases and
sales, the central bank seeks to influence holdings of these key financial
assets by private financial institutions and, accordingly, the supply of
credit and money in the broader economy.91 Monetary policy is the
principal lever through which the government seeks to stabilize the pricing
of consumer goods and services and employment levels economy-wide.92
During the recent financial crisis, central banks in the world’s leading
economies significantly expanded their traditional open market operations
to amplify their market-moving capacity. Thus, under the so-called
“quantitative easing” (“QE”) program, the Federal Reserve (via FRBNY)
commenced buying and selling a wider range of financial instruments, in
addition to US Treasury bonds, for the purpose of shoring up the prices of
particularly vulnerable or important asset classes—and shaping the overall
credit conditions more forcefully.93
While this is no place for a comprehensive evaluation of QE, it is
important to note that the example of QE shows how market-moving can
operationally overlap with market-making: in both cases, the government
actor commits to buying or selling as a means of influencing market
behavior. Insofar as the government actor effectively becomes the only
viable buyer of certain financial assets, its market-moving functions can
also overlap with market-preserving, discussed below.
C. Market-Levering
In some situations, private markets operate in a less than socially
optimal manner. Thus, a particular market may exist only in an
underdeveloped or incipient form, unable to grow beyond a certain limit.
Another market may be quite extensive and well-developed but capable of
delivering still greater public benefits if augmented, altered, or supported
in particular ways for particular purposes. Yet other markets or institutions
may not be initially expected to produce certain public goods but, with
some subtle alteration, may start doing so. In all such cases, public
90. For more information on the FRBNY’s open market operations, see Domestic Market
Operations, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/openmarket.html (last
visited June 28, 2015).
91. For a description of the mechanism of open-market operations and the workings of monetary
policy, see ANN-MARIE MEULENDYKE, U.S. MONETARY POLICY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 163–88
(1998).
92. See id.
93. See Federal Reserve Launches QE3, CNNMONEY (Sept. 13, 2012, 3:57 PM), http://money.
cnn.com/2012/09/13/news/economy/federal-reserve-qe3/index.html.
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instrumentalities may unlock or amplify existing private markets’ capacity
to benefit the broader economy, by acting either directly within these
target markets or in adjacent markets.
For instance, private financial markets might be able to provide access
to relatively reliable and affordable banking services or deposit, flood, or
loan default insurance. The availability of these financial products
increases liquidity and growth in many sectors of the economy and, thus,
constitutes an important public good. Nevertheless, it might be possible to
enjoy these public benefits on a much larger scale and/or at much lower
expense if there were but some form of secondary market or higher-order
risk-pooling arrangement augmenting the primary market. The
augmenting market or arrangement in question, however, might lie beyond
the scope of private parties’ capacities to provide at a given stage of
economic development. Or it might, for some time at least, be widely
believed to lie beyond those capacities. In such a case public provision or
facilitation of the much-needed arrangement might “lever” the primary
market into something more beneficial than it can otherwise be.
American economic history provides numerous examples of this
phenomenon. For a long time, both home mortgage and student loan
insurance were considered too risky to be underwritten by private parties.
Active markets in these products emerged only when government
instrumentalities, with their greater risk-bearing capacities, began
providing these services directly: the FHA commenced underwriting
mortgage default insurance in the 1930s, while the first governmentguaranteed student loans (“GSLs”) appeared in the 1950s.94 The
availability of these new risk-transfer channels was an enormous boost to
primary markets for home and student loans: reducing lenders’ risk
lowered borrowing costs and brought rapid market expansion. The
government intentionally levered these particular loan markets to enable a
far greater flow of private money to fund growth in homeownership and
educational advancement.
Another familiar example of the critical market-levering function
performed by the government as the ultimate risk-bearer is the federal
deposit insurance provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
94. See History of Federal Student Loan Programs, NEW AM. FOUND., http://febp.newamerica.
net/background-analysis/federal-student-loan-programs-history (last updated July 7, 2015) (noting that
in 1958, the “First federal student loan program [was] established by the National Defense Education
Act”).
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(“FDIC”) since 1933.95 The first modern deposit-guarantee scheme of its
kind, federal deposit insurance was designed as a solution to the systemic
vulnerability of the US banking sector to potentially catastrophic creditor
runs.96 As the public risk-bearer of last resort, the FDIC guarantees private
banks’ liabilities to their depositors, effectively substituting the US
government’s full faith and credit for individual banks’ credit.97 For
decades now, the FDIC insurance has been functioning to ensure a steady
flow of low-cost depositor funds into the banking system, thus levering the
national market for bank deposits.98
As these examples show, the market-levering role often closely
resembles the market-making role in its risk-resolving, public goodproviding, capital-expanding characteristics. In some cases, however, the
levering role takes a slightly different, more subtle form. For example,
public instrumentalities frequently perform important standard-setting or
related coordination problem-solving functions by creating specific criteria
for private goods they favor in their capacity as influential market
participants. This type of market-wide standardization optimizes preexisting private market infrastructure in a manner that increases the
availability of public goods at a lower cost than is otherwise possible.
For instance, before the FHA began its operations in 1934, the standard
industry practice in the United States was the extension of home loans
with a maturity of two to three years.99 Forced continuously to refinance
their short-term mortgages, many American homeowners had to live under
a constant threat of losing their homes due to the lack of affordable refinancing options. The newly established FHA generated a revolutionary
shift in market practice by encouraging the adoption of a 30-year fixed95. For an overview of the history of the FDIC, see History of the FDIC, FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/about/history/index.html (last updated Dec. 16, 2014).
96. See generally Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983) (analyzing the general dynamics of bank runs).
97. Since 2010, the FDIC insurance covers the first $250,000 of deposited funds, per depositor,
per account. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) (2014).
98. It is worth acknowledging that the FDIC insurance also has potentially negative effects on
financial markets, for example, by creating significant moral hazard problems. The pervasive nature of
these problems and the difficulty of estimating the market-distorting effects of the public subsidy
became intensely debated academic and policy issues in the wake of the recent financial crisis. See,
e.g., Franklin Allen et al., Government Guarantees and Financial Stability (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y
Research, Discussion Paper No. DP10560, 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2599552##; John Crawford, The Moral Hazard Paradox of Financial Safety Nets, 25
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2580062; Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big To Fail?: Recasting the Financial Safety Net,
in THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM 94 (Lawrence E.
Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., 2010).
99. See A Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 30, at 105. See also HOWARD, supra note 73, at 19.
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rate mortgage loan as the new industry standard. The FHA successfully
used its power as the national provider of mortgage default insurance to
create a new standardized loan product that greatly increased the demand
for home loans. Moreover, the agency’s standard-setting actions played a
critical role in facilitating the subsequent creation of the national
secondary market for home loans—an example of the government’s
market-making role discussed above.100 The Federal GSL program that
begun in 1965 (and was later renamed the Stafford Loan program) played
a similar role in setting standards for student loans.101 In both cases, the
government-led product standardization and creation of vibrant secondary
markets significantly reduced risk to private lenders and costs to
borrowers, thus, unlocking these primary markets’ full growth potential.102
This ability of large public actors to set market-wide standards in a way
that increases the benefits to society of private actors’ profit-seeking
behavior is a potentially powerful market-levering tool.
D. Market-Preserving
Private markets driven by the fundamental logic of supply-and-demand
are inherently prone to destabilizing boom-and-bust cycles. Financial
markets are especially fragile in this respect.103 Liquidity is the oxygen
that keeps financial markets alive.104 It is also the first thing that
evaporates when asset price bubbles reach outer limits and markets begin
showing their first signs of distress. As prices of distressed financial assets
fall, often with frightening speed, and prices of “safe” replacement assets
skyrocket, markets for both “bad” and “good” asset types can seize up.
Massive runs on, and emergency fire sales of, distressed assets can lead to
the complete disappearance of markets for such assets. Absent some
breathing room offered by temporary liquidity provision, liquidity shocks
can quickly morph into full-on solvency crises, followed by protracted
periods of credit contraction and depression of economic activity. The
100. See supra Part II.A.
101. See History of Federal Student Loan Programs, supra note 94.
102. There are numerous additional examples of public actors’ success in changing industry
standards, enumerating which is beyond the scope of this Article.
103. For insightful analyses of financial booms and busts throughout human history, see ERIK F.
GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (2014); CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER &
ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (2011).
104. See Timothy F. Geithner, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
Keynote Address at the 8th Annual Risk Convention and Exhibition: Liquidity and Financial Markets
(Feb. 28, 2007), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2007/gei070228.html
(“Liquidity plays a central role in the functioning of financial markets.”).
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dramatic events of 2008–2009 in the US and European financial markets
aptly revealed these dynamics.
Temporary injection of liquidity can potentially forestall the movement
from liquidity crisis to solvency crisis because, fundamentally, financial
panics represent what may be called “recursive collective action
problems.”105 Generally, a collective action problem is a situation in which
multiple individually rational decisions lead to collectively self-defeating
outcomes.106 The problem is recursive when it bears feedback properties,
such that movement in a particular direction tends to induce further
movement in the same direction, ending at no satisfactory equilibrium.107
Asset price bubbles and busts are true recursive collective action
problems in this sense. When credit is abundant and borrowing costs are
correspondingly low, it can be individually rational to borrow in order to
buy assets whose prices are rising. The aggregate effect of such
individually rational behavior, however, is irrational and unsustainable:
investors drive prices even higher, inducing more borrowing, more
buying, more price rises, in a continuous spiral of excessive risk and
leverage accumulation. When credit finally dries up, the process moves
into reverse: rational individuals simultaneously rush to sell assets whose
prices are falling, which pushes those prices even lower, leading to
defaults on borrowings, further contraction of credit, and more asset
sales.108
It is at this point that temporary provision of liquidity can break the
downward spiraling of asset prices. Essentially, busts constitute collective
undershooting—just as booms constitute collective overshooting—of
fundamental asset value.109 If, during a panic, undershooting can be
arrested in its tracks until heads cool, value can be salvaged, harm can be
minimized, and credit can be expected to flow again sooner. The problem
is that no individual market participant typically can afford to wait to find
105. This phenomenon is identified and examined in depth in Robert Hockett, Recursive
Collective Action Problems: The Structure of Procyclicality in Financial and Monetary Markets,
Macroeconomies, and Formally Similar Contexts, 3 J. FIN. PERSP. (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter
Recursive Collective Action Problems].
106. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (expounding a theory of group behavior).
107. See Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 105.
108. See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 103, at 26–38 (describing the process); Robert
Hockett, Bailouts, Buy-Ins, and Ballyhoo, 52 CHALLENGE 36, 47 (2009) (same); Robert Hockett,
Bubbles, Busts, and Blame?, CORNELL L.F., Spring 2011, at 14 (same).
109. “Fundamental” asset value generally refers to value that is sustainable in the long-term. For
more on how it can be estimated, see infra Part III.A.1.
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out whether he or she is undershooting: he or she must sell before others’
sales drive asset prices yet lower.110
A public instrumentality performing a market-preserving (or marketbackstopping) role—in this case, a specific variation on the marketmaking theme—can slow down the panic and minimize collective
undershooting. A public entity commanding sufficient resources and
unconstrained by the single-minded logic of individual-investor rationality
can credibly commit to act as a lender or purchaser of last resort,
notwithstanding prevailing market sentiment. By doing so, the entity in
question will be acting as a collective agent solving a recursive—and thus
particularly destructive and destabilizing—collective action problem.
Some recent examples of public actors’ market-preserving role were
already mentioned in the preceding discussion of market-making.111 Both
Treasury’s actions under TARP and the Federal Reserve’s emergency
liquidity provision and market-making operations in 2008–2009
represented a concerted campaign by the federal government to backstop
financial markets.112 There are also other examples of public
instrumentalities’ market-preserving actions. For instance, Fannie Mae,
with some help from FHA and the other mortgage finance GSEs, is
presently nearly the sole secondary purchaser of (qualifying) new home
mortgage loans.113 The virtual disappearance of the private secondary
market since our most recent crisis means that Fannie Mae is the principal
underwriter of the continued existence of the primary mortgage market
itself. Another example is the third round of the Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing policy (“QE3”) that was announced in September 2012
partly with a view to assisting the GSEs in their mortgage-market
preservation effort.114 An example less reminiscent of market-making and
market-moving is the role played by the US government in preserving the
US automobile manufacturing sector during 2008–2009.115 By extending
temporary credit and affording time for necessary restructuring when no
private actor was able to do so, the federal government preserved, from the
supply side, the market for domestically manufactured automobiles.
110. See, e.g., JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST,
MONEY 147–64 (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) (1936) (describing the psychology of manic buying
and panic selling in asset markets afflicted by radical uncertainty).
111. See supra Part II.A.
112. See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.
113. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 73, at 7; Min, supra note 74.
114. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., David E. Sanger et al., Bush Aids Detroit, but Hard Choices Wait for Obama, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/20/business/20auto.html?_r=3&hp&.
AND
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This last example highlights a deeply controversial aspect of the
government’s market-preserving role: the fact that, in practice, the act of
backstopping a particular market often involves bailing out specific private
actors whose reckless profit-seeking behavior brought the market to the
verge of collapse. Massive bailouts of private Wall Street firms during the
recent financial crisis generated a lot of criticism, from both sides of the
political spectrum.116 The controversy raises important normative
questions about the proper design, execution, and limits of crisis-driven
market interventions by the government.117 For our purposes, however, it
is critical to emphasize that market-preserving is a necessary function of
private markets’ own operative logic and, as such, cannot and should not
be reduced only to politically salient—and often rushed—crisis-time
bailouts and nationalizations.
Taking a conceptual view of market-preserving as a legitimate category
in the taxonomy of government roles as a direct market participant allows
us to place the debate on private-firm bailouts in a broader context. Once
we understand the purpose and place of market-preserving as a marketactor function of the government, we can envision new ways for the
government to perform that function, which go beyond the familiar—and
controversial—crisis-driven emergency measures.118 In that sense, a
taxonomy of government market-actor roles provides an analytical
framework for potentially expanding the existing toolkit of public action
in private markets. Such purposeful, deliberate expansion would
potentially move us closer toward the new model of a more far-reaching
and ambitious developmental finance state.
III. THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTAL FINANCE STATE: EXTENDING THE
ROLE OF PUBLIC ACTORS IN FINANCIAL MARKETS
As the preceding Part shows, government instrumentalities actively
participate in private markets as endogenous actors performing a variety of
roles. On the surface, government actions are indistinguishable from
actions of private market participants: they buy, sell, lend, borrow, insure,
and securitize. Fundamentally, however, what sets these public actors
apart is their express orientation toward using private market operations
primarily in order to achieve public policy goals. Government
instrumentalities are, among other things, indispensable market contrarians
116. See infra notes 203–12 and accompanying text.
117. Id.
118. See infra Part III.C.
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capable of acting counter-cyclically when no private actor can afford to do
so. These public actors use their built-in advantages—size, funding, longterm investment horizon, legal privileges, etc.—to overcome various
instances of what economists refer to as market failure and to provide socalled public goods under-provided by private actors, while also affording
benefits not easily captured by those orthodox welfare-economic
categories.119
As noted earlier, our provisional taxonomy of government-as-marketactor roles does not purport to be all-encompassing. In constructing it, we
focused on the few most conspicuous and familiar examples of public
action in financial markets and almost certainly left out important
examples of public actors playing one or more of the identified marketactor roles—or additional ones—both in the sphere of finance and outside
of it. In part, the difficulty of compiling a complete list of all such
examples may result from the lack of a clear conceptual framework
recognizing the commonalities among disparate, and often insufficiently
individuated, practices of various public actors. Government entities
themselves may be reluctant to define their actions in terms of any single,
concerted market-actor strategy, to avoid accusations of illegitimately
interfering in free markets.120 It is a sad reflection on the current state of
our polity that the government’s activities as a direct market participant
are simultaneously taken for granted and feared. As a result, the
government’s potentially transformative role as an endogenous market
participant remains, to a great extent, both hidden and significantly
constrained.121
Our hope is that providing an analytical framework and operational
vocabulary will enable a more systematic study and recognition of existing
practices. More importantly, however, our goal is to lay the conceptual
groundwork for a more proactive, assertive, and creative use of the
government-as-market-actor modality in pursuit of a broader set of public
policy objectives.
119. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
120. This statement, of course, does not apply to emergency crisis-containment measures, when
governments openly act in their market-preserving capacity and often portray their actions as part of a
deliberate strategy. It is telling, however, that even in the midst of the latest financial crisis, when the
US government had to take equity stakes in failing private firms, it took pains to emphasize its deep
reluctance to continue such direct interference in private enterprise beyond the minimum time horizon.
121. Fred Block has described the role of ideological and political factors in explaining the
similarly “hidden” nature of the federal government’s evolving capacity to finance and support private
entrepreneurs’ efforts to commercialize new technologies. See Block, supra note 7, at 182–86.
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Again, our primary focus is on financial markets and instruments. As
discussed earlier, finance is both a critical area and a powerful tool of
national development.122 The potentially transformative power of finance
is especially evident in the United States, with its modern industrialized
economy, deep pools of investors, well-developed markets, and stable
legal institutions supporting them. As Part II shows, at least since the New
Deal era, public entities have been active participants in US financial
markets. In this Part, we will build upon this experience to suggest how
government instrumentalities’ powers as endogenous market actors can be
used in a more deliberate and expansive fashion, to channel private
financial resources toward more ambitious public ends: continuous,
sustainable development against a backdrop of financial and broader
macroeconomic stability.123
In the aftermath of the latest global financial crisis, it is evident that
ensuring financial and broader macroeconomic stability is a critically
important public policy priority and a prerequisite for successful long-term
development.124 The crisis demonstrated how extreme financial instability
can destroy vast amounts of wealth and lead to protracted economic
recession (hence, lost output), both nationally and globally. Accordingly,
we argue that using the state’s market-actor capacity in a way that actively
seeks to minimize financial and macro-economic instability is an integral
part of an effective development strategy. Rather than merely correcting
specific instances of market failure, the purpose of government
intervention in financial markets should be defined in terms of proactive
prevention of systemic instability.
In this Part, we outline three potential extensions of public
instrumentalities’ traditional market-making, market-moving, marketlevering, and market-preserving functions: (1) adoption of a broader assetprice stability maintenance program; (2) establishment of a public-private
national infrastructure-funding vehicle; and (3) creation of a special
government share in privately owned financial institutions. As thought
experiments, these proposals inevitably lack in organizational detail and
are likely to generate at least as many questions as answers. The principal
purpose of this intellectual exercise, however, is not to offer blueprints but
122. See supra Part I.
123. For a discussion of the significance of national development as a continuous project, see
supra Part I.B.
124. We use the term “stability” broadly, to refer generally to smoothing out market cycles and
avoiding excessive price fluctuations.
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to test the policy-shaping potential of our provisional model of a
developmental finance state.
A. Market-Making and Market-Moving: “OMO Plus”
We start by discussing potential extensions of public actors’ traditional
market-making and market-moving functions. As noted earlier, the
FRBNY’s open market operations, or OMO, offer a classic example of the
government actor making and, more importantly, moving the market for
borrowed funds.125 Generally, public instrumentalities seek to move
market prices when both (1) the prices in question bear special systemic
significance to the economy at large, and (2) certain market dysfunctions
impair the ability of individual private actors to generate stable prices
within the range that is considered publicly desirable.126 In the context of
OMO, the price being moved by the FRBNY—the prevailing money
rental (i.e., “interest”) rate—has critical economy-wide importance.
Private actors are not able to keep that rate consistently and reliably within
acceptable ranges, in large part due to recursive collective action problems
known as credit-fueled asset price bubbles and busts.127 Importantly, the
FRBNY turns over all profits generated through OMO to the US
Treasury.128
However, there are at least two additional types of prices that are of
critical significance for the national economy: (1) prices of financial assets
(other than US Treasury securities) and (2) prevailing wage and salary
rates (the price of labor). Keeping these two types of prices within a
publicly desirable range can have an enormous macroeconomic effect,
both in terms of smoothing boom-and-bust cycles and in terms of ensuring
a more sustainable and socially inclusive pattern of national development.
In this section, we try to envision an OMO-like market-making and
market-moving regime targeting each of these two prices—financial asset
prices and labor prices—and to draw broad principles that could
potentially inform these approaches.
125. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
126. For a discussion of the reasons why we generally allow public, as opposed to private, actors
to move market prices, see supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
127. See Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 105.
128. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 11 (2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.
pdf.
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1. Open Market Operations in Financial Assets: Why Not?
Extending the FRBNY’s existing OMO mandate to cover marketmaking in a wider variety of financial instruments seems a logical and
operationally straightforward possibility. The FRBNY already runs a welloiled Treasury bond-trading machine: the Federal Open Market
Committee (“FOMC”) periodically determines broad monetary-policy
targets based on the macroeconomic data at its disposal, and the FRBNY
staff devises and implements its trading strategy in line with these
targets.129 In the wake of the latest crisis, the FRBNY also began
conducting OMO in certain mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”).130 There
seems to be no principled reason why the same FRBNY trading desk
could not start purchasing and selling, pursuant to the same general
principles, other financial instruments whose prices both significantly
affect macroeconomic trends and are subject to dysfunctional,
macroeconomically destabilizing cycle dynamics.
What might these new Open Financial Asset Market Operations
(“OFAMO”) look like? In parallel to its existing Treasury bond-trading,
the FRBNY would establish a separate trading portfolio replicating the
market portfolio. In effect, this would be an index fund reflecting the
proportional values of all financial asset classes constituting the financial
market as a whole.131 There is potentially a range of choices in
constructing this portfolio. For example, it might be easier to start with
making market in publicly-traded securities, in which case the prototype
market portfolio could be a broad stock index, such as S&P 5000 or
Wilshire 5000. However, this version of an OFAMO fund might leave
systemically important asset classes out of the FRBNY’s market-moving
reach. Thus, it is preferable to seek to replicate the entire market portfolio
as closely as possible.132
129. See generally Permanent Open Market Operations, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.,
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pomo_landing.html (last visited June 29, 2015).
130. Under its QE3 program, announced in September 2012, the Federal Reserve committed to
purchase additional agency MBS at a pace of $40 billion per month, in order to maintain a stable
secondary mortgage market. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., DOMESTIC OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS
DURING 2012 9 (2013), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/omo2012.pdf. By the
end of 2012, the FRBNY held a total of $1 trillion in face value of agency MBSs. Id.
131. The OFAMO portfolio could be constituted synthetically, rather than through the purchase of
actual assets. This option would impose fewer upfront costs. In the case of a non-synthetic portfolio,
however, the level of initial capitalization becomes particularly important, because the FRBNY’s
market-moving capacity would ride on its relative market power.
132. The composition of the market portfolio can be estimated on the basis of a number of distinct
databases and calculating methodologies. For a state-of-the-art treatment, see Ronald Doeswijk et al.,
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Once the OFAMO fund is established, the FOMC will conduct its
current daily tracking of the nation’s financial markets not only pursuant
to its macroprudential oversight mandate but also as part of its newly
expanded market intervention mandate. If, for example, a particular asset
class—such as MBS or technology stocks—rises in market value at rates
suggestive of a bubble trend, the FOMC will instruct the FRBNY trading
desk to short these securities, in order to put downward pressure on their
prices.133 Conversely, the FOMC will instruct the FRBNY to go long on
particular asset classes when they appear to be artificially undervalued.
The same process would apply with respect to broader market price
fluctuations.
In essence, the OFAMO mechanism would function as a market-actor
alternative and a complement to the currently evolving role of the Federal
Reserve as a macroprudential regulator.134 There are important potential
synergies between these two methods of bubble-and-bust preemption. The
ongoing regulatory efforts to develop effective macroprudential risk
metrics could be used to determine OFAMO trading strategy. By the same
token, the market intelligence derived in the course of asset trading would
inform the macroprudential regulators’ choices.
This point bears particular emphasis in light of objections that we
anticipate to the effect that there is no way to distinguish between bona
fide asset price changes rooted in underlying “fundamentals,” on the one
hand, and price changes that amount to “mere bubbles,” on the other.135
The Global Multi-Asset Market Portfolio, 1959–2012, 70 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 26 (2014), available at
http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/faj.v70.n2.1.
133. Acting in this manner would tend to tighten the flow of speculative credit to the asset class in
question, both because (a) speculative profit prospects would be diminished by the price drop and (b)
the Federal Reserve’s engineering the drop would signal to the market its determination that current
prices of the asset in question are artificially inflated and accordingly best suppressed.
134. For more on macroprudential regulatory policy, see generally BANK OF ENG., INSTRUMENTS
OF MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY: A DISCUSSION PAPER (2011), available at http://www.bankofengland.
co.uk/publications/Documents/other/financialstability/discussionpaper111220.pdf; Bank for Int’l
Settlements, Models and Tools for Macroprudential Analysis (Basel Comm. on Banking Superv.,
Working Paper No. 21, 2012), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp21.pdf; FIN. STABILITY
BD., OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE G20 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL STABILITY: REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD TO G20
LEADERS (2012), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_120619a.
pdf?page_moved=1; INT’L MONETARY FUND, POLICIES FOR MACROFINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO
DEAL WITH CREDIT BOOMS (2012), available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2012/sdn1206.pdf;
Paolo Angelini et al., Monetary and Macroprudential Policies (Macroprudential Research Network,
Working Paper No. 1449, 2012), available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1449.
pdf.
135. Such arguments amount to claims that the “macroprudential turn” now underway among
central bankers and financial regulators is an exercise in futility. For more on this “turn” and the new
regulatory strategies that constitute it, see generally sources cited supra note 134. For a full synthesis
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This familiar view, long associated with former Fed Chairman Alan
Greenspan, used to prompt some to argue that central banks and other
macroprudential regulators cannot effectively “lean,” ex ante, against the
“winds” that blow bubbles, but must instead aim to “clean,” ex post, the
mess left by bubbles after they have burst.136 While many authorities on
central banking and financial regulation argued forcefully against the
Greenspan position even before the most recent financial crisis, the crisis
itself seems to have finally settled debate in favor of the “leaners,” whose
view traces back to another distinguished past Chairman of the Federal
Reserve, William McChesney Martin.137 It is now widely recognized
among financial theorists, central bankers, and other macroprudential
regulators (including now Greenspan himself) that certain proxies for
fundamental value—e.g., building costs in the case of housing, or price-toequity ratios in the case of securities—can be used to identify potentially
destabilizing, transitory price rises fueled mainly by excess credit
availability.138 It is likewise now widely understood that sudden growth in
credit aggregates can serve as an important indicator of unsustainable,
leverage-driven price rises of the kind associated with bubbles.139
of the issues involved, see Robert Hockett, The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional ‘Safety and
Soundness’ to Systematic ‘Financial Stability’ in Financial Supervision, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201
(2015). For brief, summary treatment, see Robert Hockett, Leaning, Cleaning, and Macroprudence,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 27, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2013/03/27/leaning-cleaning-and-macroprudence/.
136. Scott Hamilton, Greenspan Says He Would Pre-Empt Asset Bubbles Financed by Debt,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 4, 2014, 3:14 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-04/
greenspan-says-he-would-pre-empt-asset-bubbles-financed-by-debt (“Greenspan . . . argued in office
that it was better to clean up after an asset bubble had burst rather than artificially prick it . . . .”).
137. For a sample of recent studies in this tradition, see ROBERT SHILLER, IRRATIONAL
EXUBERANCE (3d ed., 2015); Claudio Borio & Philip Lowe, Asset Prices, Financial and Monetary
Stability: Exploring the Nexus (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 114, 2002), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/work114.pdf; John Geanakoplos, Promises Promises (Cowles Found.,
Working Paper No. 1057, 2003); William R. White, Is Price Stability Enough? (Bank for Int’l
Settlements, Working Paper No. 205, 2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work205.pdf. For
more on Martin—the one Chairman of the Federal Reserve to have served longer than Greenspan—
and his views, see ROBERT P. BREMNER, CHAIRMAN OF THE FED: WILLIAM MCCHESNEY MARTIN JR.
AND THE CREATION OF THE MODERN AMERICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2004).
138. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 134–35; see also Janet Yellen, President & CEO, Fed.
Reserve Bank of S.F., Presentation to the 18th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the State of
the U.S. and World Economies—“Meeting the Challenges of the Financial Crisis”: A Minsky
Meltdown: Lessons for Central Bankers (Apr. 16, 2009), available at http://www.frbsf.org/our-district/
press/presidents-speeches/yellen-speeches/2009/april/yellen-minsky-meltdown-central-bankers/. On
Greenspan’s changed view, see Hamilton, supra note 136. On proxies for fundamental value, see
SHILLER, supra note 137; ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2008); A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra
note 78.
139. See generally Geanakoplos, supra note 137; Hamilton, supra note 136. This view was first
systematically articulated by the great early twentieth century economist Irving Fisher. See generally
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It should also be noted that the task of distinguishing “artificial” asset
price inflation or deflation from “fundamental” appreciation or
depreciation is not qualitatively more difficult than what the FOMC
already does and has long done in charting monetary policy. The latter
task, after all, requires regularly estimating “natural” potential growth
paths for the “real” economy and then targeting “appropriate” monetary
aggregates accordingly—i.e., ensuring that an “artificial” value (that of
currency in terms of goods and services) is in sync with a “fundamental”
one (that of the goods and services themselves). In sum, our proposed
OFAMO should be seen as a straightforward extension, a complement,
and a fine-tuning of what already is done and has long been done by the
Federal Reserve.
2. Open Market Operations in the Labor Market: What If?
While extending OMO to modulate price swings in financial assets
would be a natural extension of the Federal Reserve’s current trading
activities, applying the same logic of government action to modulating
price swings in the national labor market raises very different, and
potentially more difficult, operational issues. In contrast to financial
instruments, one does not “buy and hold” or “sell” labor. Nevertheless, is
it possible to imagine a system of functionally similar, macroeconomic
stability-enhancing Open Labor Market Operations (“OLMO”) operating
much like more traditional OMO?
In theory, OLMO could stabilize labor markets by operating with
respect to wage and salary rates under the same principles as OMO
currently does with respect to interest rates. The federal government—
perhaps through the Department of Labor (“DOL”)—could commit to
acting as an “employer of last resort” (“ELR”), as proposed by several
economists since the 1950s.140 It would stand willing to hire, at or slightly
below the current federal minimum wage,141 anyone laid off from a private
sector job during an economic recession.142 As unemployment rates rose,
IRVING FISHER, BOOMS AND DEPRESSIONS: SOME FIRST PRINCIPLES (1932).
140. See, e.g., L. RANDALL WRAY, UNDERSTANDING MODERN MONEY: THE KEY TO FULL
EMPLOYMENT AND PRICE STABILITY 122–54 (1998); Pavlina R. Tcherneva, Permanent on-the-Spot
Job Creation—The Missing Keynes Plan for Full Employment and Economic Transformation, 70 REV.
SOC. ECON. 57, 76 (2012). See also HYMAN P. MINSKY, ENDING POVERTY: JOBS, NOT WELFARE
(2013).
141. It might be advisable to keep the ELR wage slightly below the federal minimum prescribed
for the private sector, in order to mitigate possible moral hazard concerns that we address below.
142. While this has obvious appeal as a matter of justice, its “countercyclical,” “automatic
stabilizer” function is what is most relevant here. The National Bureau for Economic Research defines

2015]

PUBLIC ACTORS IN PRIVATE MARKETS

145

the government would absorb excess labor, maintain consumer purchasing
power, and thereby place a floor under the downward spiral. Once
macroeconomic growth resumed, the government would shed labor
through attrition as private-sector employers bid wages and benefits back
up.143
This type of ELR action resembles what we have called market-making
activity. Just like a market-maker in securities, the government here offers
wages at a “bid” price and “makes” a market for labor by standing ready to
pay this price for qualifying labor.144 In addition, an ELR program would
serve as a market-moving device in at least two respects. First, the bid
price would effectively function as a labor price target rate, similar to the
inflation target currently used in OMO. Second, the ELR program could
offer benefits and establish workplace safety standards that would
effectively function as benchmarks economy-wide.145
It must be acknowledged, however, that certain practical and
administrative difficulties would have to be addressed before any such
program could be feasible. First is the question of eligibility. To ensure
that the ELR program is functioning as an automatic stabilizer, it would be
important to admit into the program only people able to show that they
have held jobs prior to the economic downturn, to which their current
unemployment is attributable.146 Second is the question of matching up
eligible workers with tasks actually in need of being accomplished and to
which they are suited.147 The program will have to include effective means
an economic recession as a “significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy,
lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial
production, and wholesale-retail sales.” US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT’L
BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html (last visited June 30,
2015).
143. In effect, the ELR program would operate similarly to federal price support programs for
agricultural products or the Keynesian “buffer stock” program for commodities advocated in the late
1940s. See Price Support, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/ usdahome?
navid=PRICING_SUPPORT (last updated Sept. 25, 2012). For more on Keynes’s proposals for
postwar commodity price stabilization by means of buffer stock maintenance, see Robert W. Dimand
& Mary A. Dimand, J.M. Keynes on Buffer Stocks and Commodity Price Stabilization, 22 HIST. POL.
ECON. 113 (1990), available at http://www.researchgate.net/publication/247814707_ J._M._Keynes_
on_Buffer_Stocks_and_Commodity_Price_Stabilization. See also WRAY, supra note 140, at 122–54;
MINSKY, supra note 140.
144. See supra Part II.A.
145. In this capacity, the “market-moving” ELR program would function similarly to the FHA
mortgage insurance standards, discussed above. See supra Part II.C.
146. Besides keeping the focus of the program on the stabilization function, this would offer the
further advantage that beneficiaries would be known to be employable.
147. To ensure political support for this program, it must fulfill real needs for labor rather than
“make work” artificially. See Thomas I. Palley, Government as Employer of Last Resort: Can it
Work?, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, 53RD ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS 269–74
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of sorting along these lines. It would also be desirable for the program to
include a training component, which would offer a collateral benefit—
greater employability of beneficiaries in the private sector.
Third will be difficult questions concerning just where and by whom
beneficiaries will be employed—not only in terms of physical locations,
but also in terms of institutional affiliations. Will beneficiaries in
Tennessee, for example, have to move to California for some positions, or
will there be some means of ensuring that no one need move? Relatedly,
will these beneficiaries all work within federal government agencies—e.g.,
some newly created government enterprise administered by DOL—or will
the DOL operate as a sort of “temp service” broker farming out labor to
states, municipalities, and/or private employers? The first option raises
concerns about how quickly and efficiently the federal government could
establish a new enterprise pursuing worthwhile projects dischargeable by
mostly temporary labor. The second option avoids those concerns but
raises new ones—e.g., the prospect of private firms’ laying off more of
their own workers to capitalize on cheaper federally-supplied ones. This is
a critical tradeoff that may not be possible to resolve in the abstract.
A fourth question is whether beneficiaries would be treated as regular,
albeit temporary, federal employees entitled to the same benefits as more
permanent ones. If not, then some care will have to be taken in defining
these beneficiaries’ status, in order to avoid stigmatization. A related
question concerns moral hazard: will an ELR program induce or
encourage complacency and poor work habits among beneficiaries? In
theory, this risk could be addressed through a combination of (1) keeping
the ELR wage and benefits package slightly less, or at the very least no
more, attractive than the least attractive private-sector alternative,148 and
(2) terminating the ELR employment of anyone who proves repeatedly
problematic as an employee.149
Finally, a fifth question concerns funding. Generally, this could be
accomplished through garden-variety countercyclical financing, whereby
the federal government discharges its slack-absorbing role during
macroeconomic slumps through loose monetary and debt-financed fiscal
(2001), available at http://www.thomaspalley.com/docs/articles/macro_policy/government_employer.
pdf.
148. This might mean keeping the legislated federal minimum wage on the books, and keeping the
ELR wage just below it.
149. “Problematic” might mean not turning up, making the workplace environment “hostile,” etc.
Perhaps some type of “three strikes” rule would be in order. See WRAY, supra note 140, at 122–54.
Implementing these controls, however, may create additional administrative complexities.
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policy. Once private-sector growth is restored, excess money is mopped
back up, while debt is retired via the restored tax revenues.150
Ultimately, these types of issues may render OLMO too politically
toxic and/or difficult to implement in practice. Yet, if it were feasible,
OLMO could greatly increase the national economy’s resilience, stability,
and long-term growth potential. Thus, it is worthwhile to have an openminded and detail-oriented discussion of its potential benefits and
shortcomings. This Article, however, pursues a far more modest goal of
illustrating how this kind of a program would fit into the broader universe
of the government’s market-actor roles.
B. Market-Levering: Financing National Infrastructure
The transformative—market-levering, in the broadest sense—potential
of the modern developmental finance state is especially evident in the
realm of national infrastructure.
1. Infrastructure as a Developmental Challenge
It is no secret that America’s basic infrastructure—roads, bridges,
tunnels, railways, airports, drinking water and waste water facilities,
energy grids, and public schools and transportation—is outdated, worn,
and generally unable to meet the country’s growing needs.151 Over the last
decade, the American Society of Civil Engineers (“ASCE”) has
consistently graded American transport, water, school, and other
infrastructures with marks of “D+” or lower.152 Rebuilding this system is a
necessary pre-condition for future increases in productivity, economic
150. Countercyclical stabilization policy in both its fiscal and monetary dimensions figures
prominently in most macroeconomics textbooks. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER,
MACROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES & POLICY 213–76 (12th ed. 2012).
151. See HEIDI CREBO-REDIKER & DOUGLAS REDIKER, FINANCING AMERICA’S
INFRASTRUCTURE: PUTTING GLOBAL CAPITAL TO WORK (2008), available at http://www.voltairenet.
org/IMG/pdf/Financing_America_Infrastructure.pdf; MICHAEL LIKOSKY, OBAMA’S BANK: FINANCING
A DURABLE NEW DEAL (2010); OFFICE OF MANHATTAN BOROUGH PRESIDENT SCOTT M. STRINGER,
BANKING ON THE FUTURE: A NEW PARADIGM FOR REBUILDING OUR NATION’S INFRASTRUCTURE
(2011) [hereinafter STRINGER], available at http://www.baruch.cuny.edu/realestate/pdf/H7656_
BaruchBankingFutureWhtPaper.pdf.
152. See 2013 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS,
http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/ (“D+”) (last visited June 30, 2015); 2009 Report Card for
America’s Infrastructure, AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/2009/
sites/default/files/RC2009_exsummary.pdf (“D”) (last visited June 30, 2015); 2005 Report Card for
America’s Infrastructure, AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, http://ascelibrary.org/doi/pdf/10.1061/
9780784478851 (“D”) (last visited June 30, 2015).
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growth, stronger communities, and better quality of life. In that sense, it is
a classic national-development project.
It is also an expensive one. According to the ASCE’s estimates, the
necessary improvements in infrastructure quality would require investment
ranging from $1.6 to $3.6 trillion.153 Financing infrastructure projects
tends to be a capital-intensive and risky activity. Not surprisingly,
governments—be they state, local, or even national—often are too
financially strapped to undertake significant infrastructure repair and
expansion projects on their own.154 Private investors, on the other hand,
often lack simple or straightforward means by which to channel their
surplus capital toward infrastructure projects that promise returns
compatible with their risk and liquidity preferences. Two main reasons,
both of which will likely ring familiar to economists, are typically cited to
explain the difficulty with attracting much-needed private capital
investment in infrastructure projects.
The first cited reason that private investment opportunity is limited is
that public infrastructure generally either takes the form of a nonexcludable good (meaning that private parties are not able fully to recoup
their investments via privately assessed user fees)155 or is better provided
directly by governments or regulated monopolies than via competitive
markets due to grid effects and/or increasing returns to scale.156 Thus,
153. See sources cited supra note 152. While the ASCE might not be altogether financially
disinterested in the “grades” it assigns American infrastructure, its assessments appear to be widely
endorsed or complemented by other assessments and reports.
154. See CREBO-REDIKER & REDIKER, supra note 151, at 9.
155. An example of a non-excludable good is an air traffic control system. It is neither the sort of
thing that would be safe to have operating in parallel with other, competing systems, nor the sort of
thing that could easily and safely exclude flyers who had not helped pay for that system, absent
significant government involvement. Strictly speaking, a good is a “public” good only when it is both
non-excludable and non-rivalrous, while rivalrous non-excludable goods—e.g., fish stocks, timber,
commons areas—are separately classified as “common pool” resources. For present purposes it is nonexcludability that matters most. “Privately” assessed user fees refer to fees that would be levied by a
private builder or owner of the infrastructure in question, then passed along in the form of dividends,
capital gains, or interest payments to owners of and/or other investors in the private firm in question.
156. Where an industry requires large up-front costs of production, so that costs per unit of
production steadily diminish as quantities produced increase, a single provider is, all else equal, more
efficient than are multiple providers in aggregate. In this case, the industry in question is said to lend
itself to “natural monopoly.” Closely related but analytically distinct is the phenomenon of a “grid”
technology, such as a railroad, fiber-optic cable, or electrical powerline network, which typically not
only involves high upfront costs and consequent increasing returns to scale, but also threatens
excessive and congestive physical capacity—e.g., multiple competing parallel highways or
powerlines—in the absence of monopoly. Formally, see William J. Baumol, On the Proper Cost Tests
for Natural Monopoly in a Multiproduct Industry, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 809 (1977); see also WILLIAM
J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982)
(expounding a general theory of contestable markets).
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dams, levees, power grids, roads, rail, bridges, systems of waste disposal,
sewage and water supply, and many other utilities are all canonical public
goods157 that are most efficiently supplied by a canonical natural
monopoly, which means that some government instrumentality either will
directly supply the system in question or will be closely bound up with
whatever “private” provider receives the monopoly privilege.158
The second reason that private capital is not able to channel sufficient
funds to finance public infrastructure is the absence of deep secondary
market capacity.159 State and local governments typically borrow large
sums upfront to fund significant infrastructure projects—by issuing
general or project-specific revenue bonds—and then use their tax revenues
or user fees to repay ensuing debt obligations over time. 160 However, this
mode of finance raises a specific difficulty against the backdrop of our
disaggregated and localized system of government: bond issuances by
relatively small individual administrative units are inevitably small in
comparison to competing investments like Treasury bonds or blue-chip
corporate securities.161 Markets in such instruments tend to be thinner and
less liquid than markets for competing investments, which discourages
risk-averse private capital from flowing to them on optimally favorable
terms.162
Thus, there is a strong argument that the lack of an active secondary
market keeps states’ and municipalities’ infrastructural borrowing costs
needlessly high, as private investors demand risk and liquidity premia on
their illiquid, thinly traded bonds. And so trillions of dollars of private
(and even some public) capital which could finance localized public
infrastructure—including pension fund, insurance company, mutual fund,
sovereign wealth fund, and even foreign central bank capital—remain
157. For sources discussing the categories of public goods and market failure, see supra note 61.
158. Health insurance and other species of “social” insurance also fall into this category. See
generally Robert Hockett, Making Sense of the Healthcare Reform Debate, 53 CHALLENGE 28 (2010)
(showing that canonical forms of social insurance constitute natural monopolies best publicly provided
or tightly regulated).
159. See CREBO-REDIKER & REDIKER, supra note 151, at 4.
160. See id. at 6; see also KPMG, INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT: BRIDGING THE GAP (2012),
available at https://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/insight-magazine/
Documents/insight-investmentv3.pdf; SCOTT RAWLINS & JIM RAY, KPMG, FINDING A NEW WAY TO
FUND HIGHWAY INFRASTRUCTURE (2014), https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2014/04/
foresight-22.pdf; L. Owen Kirkpatrick & Michael P. Smith, The Infrastructural Limits to Growth:
Rethinking the Urban Growth Machine in Times of Fiscal Crisis, 35 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES.
477 (2011).
161. See, e.g., CREBO-REDIKER & REDIKER, supra note 151, at 4.
162. See id.
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under- or untapped.163 In this sense, the market for large-scale institutional
investments in American infrastructure represents an incipient or
incomplete market that could potentially be “levered” into doing much
more. Indeed, the situation is strikingly reminiscent of what we described
earlier in connection with national mortgage markets prior to the New
Deal.164
This analogy has not been lost on policy-makers. In recent years, there
have been several attempts to propose reforms of public infrastructure
finance in the United States.165 While differing in specific details, these
proposals generally seek to institute a new federal instrumentality—
sometimes labeled a National Infrastructure Bank (“NIB”)—charged with
facilitating public infrastructure finance, mainly through some
combination of direct federal grants, loan guarantees, and insurance.166
Building on some of the existing proposals, however, it is possible to
envisage an NIB that goes beyond these familiar methods and performs
the government’s role as a market actor in a more explicit and proactive
way.
2. Basic Proposal: National Infrastructure Bank
In its basic form, an NIB would seek to amplify and optimize the
currently sub-optimal system of public-private cooperation in the area of
163. See sources cited supra note 160. The availability of this capital is made evident by both the
contents and the very existence of cheerful Wiley Publishing Company investor titles including NEIL
S. GRIGG, INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE: THE BUSINESS OF INFRASTRUCTURE FOR A SUSTAINABLE
FUTURE (2010); MICHAEL D. UNDERHILL, THE HANDBOOK OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTING (2010);
and BARBARA WEBER & HANS WILHELM ALFEN, INFRASTRUCTURE AS AN ASSET CLASS:
INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, PROJECT FINANCE, AND PPP (2010). The existence of these investorcatering books is not the sole testament to the hunger of private investors for infrastructure
investments. See KPMG, supra note 160; RAWLINS & RAY, supra note 160; Greg Roumeliotis & Mike
Stone, Exclusive: Infrastructure Investors Line Up for Indiana Toll Road, REUTERS (Oct. 15, 2014,
4:48 AM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/10/14/us-indianatollroad-m-a-idINKCN0I32T720141014.
164. See supra Part II.A.
165. See, e.g., Nation Building Here at Home Act of 2012, H.R. 4352, 112th Cong. (2012),
available at https://www.congress.gov/112/bills/hr4352/BILLS-112hr4352ih.pdf; National Infrastructure
Bank Act of 2007, S. 1926, 110th Cong. (2007), available at https://www.congress.gov/110/bills/
s1926/BILLS-110s1926is.pdf; National Infrastructure Bank Act of 2007, H.R. 3401, 110th Cong.
(2007), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr3401ih/pdf/BILLS-110hr3401ih.pdf;
National Infrastructure Development Act of 2007, H.R. 3896, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
https://www.congress.gov/110/bills/hr3896/BILLS-110hr3896ih.pdf; Fiscal Year 2016 Budget
Overview, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/overview (last visited July
5, 2015); Joseph Weber, Obama to Propose $50B in Infrastructure Projects, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 6,
2010), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/sep/6/obama-propose-50b-infrastructure-projects/.
166. See sources cited supra note 165; see also EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, WE ARE BETTER THAN
THIS: HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD SPEND OUR MONEY 287–89 (2015) (discussing the idea of an
NIB).
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infrastructure finance. In terms of our taxonomy, NIB operations would
most immediately fit within the market-levering category.167 From that
perspective, an NIB can be viewed as an infrastructure-specific analogue
to the home finance GSEs, as well as to various other forms of “publicprivate partnership” (“P3”).168
The GSE experience is particularly instructive here because of the
strikingly similar nature of the problems currently plaguing the US market
for infrastructure finance and those that plagued US home loan markets
before the creation of Fannie Mae.169 As discussed earlier, pre-New Deal
mortgage markets were localized, small-scale, and illiquid, which raised
borrowing costs for homebuyers and prevented the emergence of a wellfunctioning national market for mortgage finance.170 Fannie Mae remedied
these inefficiencies by making a secondary market in FHA-standardized
mortgage instruments and thereby lowering both private lenders’ risks and
borrowers’ costs.171 Moreover, by creating a nation-wide market and
leaning upon the full faith and credit of the United States as a backstop,
Fannie Mae was able to pool and ensure risk on a much larger scale than
could any primary lender-bank at the time.
167. Proponents of infrastructure banks sometimes refer explicitly to these institutions’ capacity to
“leverage” private capital. See, e.g., STRINGER, supra note 151, at 1 (advocating “using small amounts
of government money to leverage substantial sums of private sector money to achieve important social
objectives”).
168. In today’s discourse, the term “public-private partnership”—P3 or PPP—refers to a broad
universe of diverse and context-specific arrangements. For summaries and assessments of recent P3
arrangements in Europe and elsewhere, see JEFFREY DELMON, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP
PROJECTS IN INFRASTRUCTURE: AN ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR POLICY MAKERS (2011); EDUARDO ENGEL
ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: A BASIC GUIDE (2014); DARRIN
GRIMSEY & MERVYN K. LEWIS, PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: THE WORLDWIDE REVOLUTION IN
INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION AND PROJECT FINANCE (2004); LIKOSKY, supra note 151; E. R.
YESCOMBE, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: PRINCIPLES OF POLICY AND FINANCE (2007). In the
United States, P3 models for infrastructure financing are used mainly by individual states and
municipalities. See, e.g., GEORGE CAROLLO ET AL., PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR
INFRASTRUCTURE DELIVERY (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2149313; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-728, WASTEWATER INFRASTRUCTURE
FINANCING: STAKEHOLDER VIEWS ON A NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE BANK AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/306947.pdf. The nature and policy
impact of individual P3s differ greatly. Many P3 infrastructure projects involve little more than
government outsourcing of various project-related functions to private parties, which raises familiar
problems. P3s may also involve loan guarantees and/or direct public financing alongside private
lenders. While cognizant of this variety, for purposes of this Article, we focus specifically on
mechanisms explicitly operating via the government-as-market-actor modality.
169. See CREBO-REDIKER & REDIKER, supra note 151, at 9–10 (making a similar GSE analogy).
Their policy recommendations directly build upon the Fannie Mae model, as it would apply to
infrastructure finance. Our version of an NIB as a market-levering government actor incorporates
many of their insights.
170. See supra Part II.A.
171. See supra Part II.A.
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This experience suggests that today’s fragmented and illiquid market
for infrastructure finance needs an institution—a large public
instrumentality—that would pool municipal bonds and their associated
default and liquidity risks.172 Like the early Fannie Mae, an NIB would be
initially capitalized by the federal government.173 State or municipal
contributions might also, but need not, be required or solicited. To
leverage public money, the NIB would issue bonds (or some mix of debt
and equity) and commit to pay out returns associated with particular
issuances on the strength of (1) user fees and dedicated revenues that could
feasibly be levied for the purpose; (2) dedicated pools of collateral, in the
manner of the European-style covered bonds; and (3) the ultimate full faith
and credit of the United States.174
The federal government’s “full faith and credit” backup is a
particularly potent factor in this respect. Explicitly backed by the US
government, the NIB is likely to be a much larger and more powerful
market actor than any private municipal-bond-pooling entity, in the same
way as Fannie Mae has always dwarfed all non-federal competitors in the
secondary home mortgage markets. It is reasonable to expect that NIB
bonds will attract great interest from large institutional investors—pension
funds, investment companies, investment banks, foreign central banks, and
sovereign wealth funds—who would view these bonds as close substitutes
for US Treasury bonds and agency securities issued by the GSEs.
It is hard to over-estimate the significance of this factor, not only for
purposes of financing infrastructure projects but, importantly, from the
perspective of systemic financial stability. Large, globally active
institutional investors seem to be constantly searching for instruments that
are nearly as low-risk as US Treasury bonds but offer higher returns. 175
172. See CREBO-REDIKER & REDIKER, supra note 151, at 8; see also sources cited supra note 165.
173. All of the current proposals require initial congressional capitalization of an NIB-type entity,
although the precise levels of such proposed capitalization vary. See CREBO-REDIKER & REDIKER,
supra note 151, at 2. Current proposals generally do not require state or municipal capital
contributions.
174. See proposals cited supra note 165. “Covered bonds” are a form of collateralized bond
instrument, similar to US asset-backed securities, except that the collateral in question is typically
guaranteed by a government entity. First developed in Prussia and Denmark during the late 18th
century and reminiscent of first US Treasury Secretary Hamilton’s “sinking fund” model of public
finance, covered bonds have become increasingly popular in Europe over the past several decades as
modes of public finance. See generally EUR. COVERED BOND COUNCIL, 2015 ECBC EUR. COVERED
BOND FACT BOOK (2015), available at http://ecbc.hypo.org/Content/Default.asp?PageID=501
(providing a comprehensive overview of covered bonds as an asset class).
175. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke et al., International Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe Assets
in the United States, 2003-2007 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., International Finance
Discussion Paper No. 1014, 2011), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2011/1014/
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This search for yield creates potentially destabilizing demand for complex
financial instruments structured to generate high returns, while hiding the
true extent of underlying risk.176 Creating a brand new asset class that
serves as a legitimately “safe” alternative to US Treasury bonds, while
offering a potentially higher yield, would allow the channeling of this
demand away from the riskier and more speculative assets.177 To enhance
the appeal of this new asset class to institutional investors, it would be
desirable to grant NIB bonds the same regulatory and discount window
treatment as US Treasury bonds, agency securities, and some forms of
commercial paper currently receive under the applicable risk-based capital
adequacy and the Federal Reserve’s discounting regimes, respectively.178
The NIB would use the funds raised through its bond issuances to
purchase and pool revenue bonds and project bonds issued by
municipalities, public utilities, and other government instrumentalities
seeking financing to fund infrastructure projects.179 It is important that the
NIB impose certain eligibility criteria on prospective securities, in order to
ensure commercial viability of the model. If the NIB adheres strictly to
these criteria, it would help to ensure continuously high demand for NIB
bonds from large institutional investors.180
ifdp1014.pdf (examining the effects of the growing demand from foreign investors for US government
debt); Arvind Krishnamurthy & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, The Aggregate Demand for Treasury
Debt (2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/ offices/RoundTable/
2011%20session%204%20vissing_tsy%20demand%20PAPER.pdf (documenting investors’ preferences
for US Treasury bonds); Zoltan Pozsar, Institutional Cash Pools and the Triffin Dilemma of the U.S.
Banking System (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 11/190, 2011), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11190.pdf (analyzing the dynamics and implications
of investor demand for safe, high-quality assets).
176. See sources cited supra note 175. This search for yield fueled the junk-bond craze of the
1980s, interest in loan participations during the 1990s, and the mortgage-backed securities bubble in
the early to mid-2000s. During that last episode, high-risk MBSs and related products were structured
specifically to get the highest credit ratings indicating their supposedly “riskless” status, while paying
interest at rates higher than US government bonds.
177. For more on the desirability of creating such assets, see Pozsar, supra note 175, at 21–24.
178. The Federal Reserve’s discounting regime, pursuant to which the central bank “monetizes”
certain eligible forms of commercial paper, is embodied at 12 U.S.C. § 372 (2014). The FDICadministered capital-regulatory regime, pursuant to which some forms of safe and/or favored assets are
risk-weighted at less than 100%, is embodied at 12 C.F.R. pt. 325 (2015).
179. See sources cited supra note 165.
180. Advocates of current NIB proposals point out that the European Investment Bank (“EIB”)
operates much in the manner described above and attracts plentiful private capital to fund European
infrastructure projects. The EIB was established in 1958 and is owned and operated by the EU
member-states. Its mission is to foster, through a variety of public-private investment partnerships, the
continued infrastructural development and economic integration of the European Union. For more, see
EUR. INV. BANK, http://www.eib.org/ (last visited July 6, 2015). The EIB has proved quite effective in
tapping the global capital markets, selling its bonds to the same pension funds, sovereign wealth funds,
and other financial intermediaries that routinely buy US Treasury bonds and other global “blue-chip”
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In the future, the NIB might develop the capacity not only to pool
municipal and other public utility bonds as a secondary purchaser but also
to originate infrastructure loans for particular projects. For instance, it
might start by extending loans to federal agencies charged with
infrastructure-provision—e.g., the Federal Highway Administration—and
then add direct lending to states or municipalities in need of further
infrastructure funding. Although current proposals do not articulate this
goal, it may be desirable to require the NIB to target and prioritize projects
that have some national socio-economic significance. Developing its
capacities along these lines, the NIB might ultimately become a fullservice project- and infrastructure-finance institution.
The NIB we describe above would be a classic market-making and
market-levering actor, along the lines of the original Fannie Mae model.
This basic version of an NIB is not entirely novel: it explicitly
incorporates many elements of existing policy proposals. Perhaps more
importantly, this basic version of an NIB remains fundamentally grounded
in the familiar justifications and macroeconomic categories of public
goods, market failure, and market incompleteness. This frame of
reference, however, may be too narrow, and confining the debate to its
conceptual limits may prevent the emergence of a more ambitious and
normatively compelling version of an NIB as a principal vehicle through
which to pursue a continuous and sustainable national development
strategy. Moving beyond the limits of the current debate on infrastructure
finance, we can start outlining the general contours of this new and more
ambitious version of an NIB.
3. Advanced Proposal: National Capital Management Corporation
An NIB based on our understanding should be seen as a permanent
instrumentality that proactively facilitates and promotes not only the
restoration or extension of currently inadequate physical infrastructure but
also more transformative projects aimed at “leapfrogging” America along
a progressive developmental trajectory. We envision an NIB providing
infrastructure that leads or revolutionizes markets, in ways that the polity
deems desirable, rather than merely follows existing markets’ immediate
dictates. For example, a proactive NIB might not merely seek to ensure
securities—while steering clear of US municipal bonds. See CREBO-REDIKER & REDIKER, supra note
151, at 4–5.
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that petroleum is available nationwide but could act systematically to
convert our energy system from petro- to hydrogen-based.181
An NIB reconceived along these lines would require a different
approach to structuring and financing its activities than the GSE-inspired
models entail. Because its mission is potentially more ambitious, it should
not rely entirely on debt financing but should tap into additional sources of
funding—mezzanine and even equity capital.182 This strategy would serve,
in part, to attract more capital and, in part, to attract more ambitious, less
risk-averse capital of the sort that typically comes from equity investors.
How might this be done?
In our model, this next-generation infrastructure-development entity—
which we call the National Capital Management Corporation (“NCMC”
or, perhaps, “Nicky Mac”)—would operate very much like an investment
management company sponsoring and running one or more private equity
funds.183 Some of these funds would be set up to invest in individual
infrastructure projects, while others would hold broader portfolios of
projects with particular risk-return profiles sought by the target investors.
In direct parallel to private equity (“PE”) firms, NCMC would act as the
sponsor and general partner of each individual fund it sets up. In its
capacity as the fund’s general partner, NCMC would contribute some
capital of its own, but the majority of the fund’s capital would come from
private investors that become passive limited partners in the same fund.
NCMC would manage the resultant pool of assets much as any private
fund manager would do, assembling a portfolio of promising investment
projects which, while involving some risk of not panning out in some
cases, would be sufficiently diversified as substantially to lay-off
appreciable quanta of risk.184 Individual investments in the fund’s portfolio
181. Something similar is behind the 2008 Clean Energy Bank proposals of Senators Bingaman
and Domenici and Representatives Inslee and Israel. See 21st Century Energy Technology
Deployment Act, H.R. 2212, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS111hr2212ih/pdf/BILLS-111hr2212ih.pdf; 21st Century Energy Technology Deployment Act, S.
3233, 110th Cong. (2008), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110s3233is/pdf/BILLS110s3233is.pdf; Clean Energy Investment Bank Act of 2008, S. 2730, 110th Cong. (2008), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110s2730is/pdf/BILLS-110s2730is.pdf.
182. Others have argued that, in order to finance large-scale infrastructure projects, traditional
forms of debt must be supplemented with other capital instruments. See, e.g., KPMG, supra note 160,
at 10–11. “Mezzanine capital” refers, generally, to preferred stock, subordinated debt, and other hybrid
instruments combining the elements of both debt and equity.
183. For more on private equity funds in general, see EILEEN APPELBAUM & ROSEMARY BATT,
PRIVATE EQUITY AT WORK: WHEN WALL STREET MANAGES MAIN STREET (2014); HARRY
CENDROWSKI ET AL., PRIVATE EQUITY: HISTORY, GOVERNANCE, AND OPERATIONS (2d ed. 2012).
184. See supra note 180. As mentioned earlier, some of the NCMC funds may be set up and
marketed as single-project investment vehicles. The composition of each fund’s assets, its investment
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may be structured in various ways, depending on the nature of selected
projects and NCMC’s managerial judgment. As with many private funds,
NCMC would require that limited partners agree to lock up all or some
part of their investment dollars with the fund for some set minimum period
of time.185
The compensation and profit-sharing structure of the NCMC funds
would also track the traditional PE model.186 Like any fund manager,
NCMC would charge an annual management fee and a contingent
performance fee—“carried interest,” or “carry.”187 To enhance the
attractiveness of the NCMC funds as a new asset class, however, it might
be desirable to offer some additional incentives to private investors. The
US government backup is a particularly strong potential sweetener in this
respect. Thus, the government could potentially guarantee the return of all
or a substantial part of private investors’ principal upon the expiration of a
specified lock-up period. The government could also guarantee a certain
minimum rate of return on private parties’ investments—either for the
duration of the lock-up period, for some shorter period of time, or even for
as long as the investor keeps its interest in the fund.
Furthermore, in some cases the profit-sharing component could
potentially be structured in layers. For example, the NCMC, in its capacity
as the manager of a particular fund, could relinquish all carry due to it on
the first tier of the fund’s net profits. Carry charged on profits above that
threshold could also vary, gradually increasing to 20%. If the fund’s
profits exceed some relatively high threshold, however, it may be
desirable to increase the NCMC’s carry to capture all of such top-tier
super-gains. In effect, this model would present private investors with new
investment opportunities that would (1) replicate bonds in their guarantee
of principal and possibly some modest rate of return, (2) then offer carryfree equity bands, essentially entitling them to all net profits, and (3) then
offer one or more traditional PE-like equity bands entitling them to
strategy, and its profit-sharing and fee structure would ultimately depend on the economics of the
underlying projects and the risk appetites of the targeted private investors. The NCMC would, in
effect, tailor its products to reflect both the public’s needs and the private investors’ preferences.
185. See sources cited supra note 183.
186. For an overview of compensation arrangements in PE firms, see CENDRWOSKI ET AL., supra
note 183.
187. Typically, the management fee equals 2% of (private) assets under management, while carry
equals 20% of the fund’s net profits. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership
Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008).
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predetermined percentages of net profits, possibly capped by specified
ceilings.188
Of course, offering these risk-minimizing benefits might not be
necessary with respect to each individual NCMC fund, especially where
the fund invests in projects with strong revenue-generating potential
and/or targets investors with high risk tolerance. The NCMC should not
simply socialize the risk of infrastructure investments while generating
gratuitous windfalls for its private partners. At the same time, however,
additional government guarantees and profit-sharing benefits could be
effective in attracting certain types of relatively risk-averse capital or
funding certain types of projects. Our brief outline of potentially useful
asset enhancement techniques is merely suggestive, as each individual
NCMC fund’s risk- and profit-sharing structure would need to be
determined on a case-by-case basis.
The key point is that, if properly structured and priced, NCMC funds
should be an attractive new asset class available to current private equity
and hedge fund investors, as well as to broader swaths of large
institutional investors searching for yield.189 As noted earlier, it is difficult
to over-estimate the significance of creating this new asset class for
protecting systemic financial stability: by channeling the flow of yieldhungry capital away from complex, high-risk financial instruments, it
would help to minimize the danger of another financial market bubble.190
The sources of the returns generated by the NCMC-managed funds
would vary depending on the specific projects in which they invest.191
However, it is also important not to overlook the fact that infrastructural
optimization would enable the federal government to reap the full benefits
of scale economies and recapture positive externalities associated with the
nation-wide provision of public goods.192 These gains would bolster the
government’s ability to offer or guarantee stipulated returns to private
investors in NCMC funds. This is particularly true in light of the potential
188. The viability of such a tiered profit-sharing model and its precise structure would have to be
determined through financial cost-benefit analysis, taking into account all relevant considerations.
189. For a discussion of the importance of this factor, see sources cited supra notes 176–78 and
accompanying text.
190. Id.
191. For example, a project of intercity light rail construction or a network of hydrogen- or
electrically-powered vehicle refueling or recharging stations could generate returns through user fees
or targeted taxes.
192. See KLEINBARD, supra note 166, at 283–85 (discussing substantial productivity returns to
public investments in infrastructure).
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positive effects of the NCMC-financed infrastructure projects on
employment and, hence, income tax revenues.193
Structuring and operating the NCMC along these lines would
potentially broaden the range of projects it can undertake and, more
generally, enhance its capacity to act in a truly entrepreneurial, forwardlooking manner, as befits a PE-like market actor—but with an explicit
view to important socially beneficial ends, as befits a public market
actor.194 Again, for example, if a national consensus were to emerge that a
massive shift to hydrogen- or electrically-powered automobiles would be
desirable in the long run, but the near-term private establishment of broad
networks of hydrogen or electrical refueling stations is stymied by familiar
collective action problems, NCMC would be well-positioned to take the
lead in effecting the needed change. The same logic could apply to a much
broader range of development-oriented strategic decisions. For instance,
were we to decide as a society that the current global distribution of
Ricardian comparative advantage operates to the unnecessary
disadvantage of our manufacturing capacity, NCMC could lead a
concerted effort to rectify the resulting structural imbalances, in part by
channeling funds into new technology or other innovative ventures.195 In
effect, the NCMC model would merge our vision of a developmental
finance state with what other social scientists have termed a
“developmental network state”—an evolving institutionalized pattern of
193. Even very conservative macroeconomic models indicate that the positive employment, GDPgrowth, and consequent income tax revenue increases generated by significant infrastructure
investment would largely, if not wholly, offset project costs in the current low interest-rate
environment. See Robert C. Hockett & Robert H. Frank, Public Infrastructure Investment, Renewed
Economic Growth, and the U.S. Fiscal Position 17 (Cornell Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 12-04, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1987656; Robert C.
Hockett, White Paper in Support of the Nation Building Here at Home Act of 2012 15 (Cornell Law
Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-10, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2029239.
194. By putting the NCMC team in charge of managing the public-private capital, our proposed
model effectively reverses the familiar P3 pattern, in which private actors manage the money and
make investment decisions. Placing a public actor in charge of managing infrastructure investments
would also help to avoid the well-known and widely-criticized P3 dynamic, whereby the government
bears disproportionately high implicit costs of financing certain projects by virtue of redirecting large
future revenue streams to private partners. See KLEINBARD, supra note 166, at 287.
195. For instance, if cheaper foreign labor is what drives manufacturing capacity overseas, the
United States might use NCMC to subsidize the wholesale adoption of robotic and 3D-printing
technologies throughout the economy, while requiring recipient firms to issue new shares in
themselves to the citizenry in return. For more on Ricardian comparative advantage and associated
premises that figure into orthodox trade theory, see, e.g., ANDREA MANESCHI, COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 10–18 (1998). The locus
classicus is DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (Prometheus
Books 1996) (1817).
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government intervention aimed at resolving network failures that hinder
commercialization of technological and scientific advances.196
From this perspective, one might imagine numerous possibilities for a
more seamlessly integrated developmental strategy.197 Undoubtedly,
identifying and operationalizing potential synergies is a complex task that
raises various economic, legal, and organizational issues.198 Our present
goal is merely to suggest some possibilities for building a proactive,
entrepreneurial, and development-oriented national infrastructurefinancing body. As discussed above, the operations of this new public
actor—both in its basic NIB version and in its more advanced NCMC
version—represent a direct expansion of the government’s marketlevering function. However, it could also play significant market-making,
market-moving, and market-backstopping roles. The NCMC model is
particularly likely to act as a market-maker, by actively inducing
infrastructural change that would not otherwise happen and thus creating
new markets for financial instruments. Both the NIB and NCMC models
could also perform the market-moving and market-backstopping
functions. For example, if there were signs that demand for state or local
infrastructure-related bonds was becoming either too overheated or too
lackluster, making local borrowing either too easy or too expensive, an
NIB/NCMC could modulate the price swings through open market
operations. Alternatively, if the value of infrastructure bonds suddenly
plummeted as a result of a broader market panic, an NIB/NCMC might
stabilize these markets by temporarily acting as a “buyer of last resort.”
196. For discussions of this phenomenon, see SEÁN Ó RIAIN, THE POLITICS OF HIGH-TECH
GROWTH: DEVELOPMENTAL NETWORK STATES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 5 (2004) (drawing a
conceptual distinction between a “developmental network state” and a “developmental bureaucratic
state”); Block, supra note 7, at 172; Matthew R. Keller & Fred Block, Explaining the Transformation
in the US Innovation System: The Impact of a Small Government Program, 11 SOCIO-ECONOMIC REV.
629, 650 (2012).
197. For instance, it might be possible to integrate the proposed NCMC with the existing Small
Business Administration (“SBA”), established in 1953, to facilitate small business formation and
growth via the so-called “three Cs” of capital, contracting, and counseling. See About the SBA, U.S.
SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/category/navigation-structure/about-sba (last visited July 1,
2015). This combined federal instrumentality—which we tentatively call a National Investment
Authority (“NIA”)—would facilitate integration of both infrastructure and SBA “start-up” funding
policy and programs into a more comprehensive and coherent national development strategy. We plan
to examine this institutional possibility in a separate project.
198. Generally, the degree of practical feasibility and potential efficacy of the proposed NCMC
structure would ultimately depend on numerous factors we did not discuss in detail here: how the
NCMC is set up and integrated within the federal government’s structure, what substantive and
procedural rules apply to its operations, how exactly the relationship between NCMC and private
investors in its funds is governed, and so on. These questions, however, are properly a subject of a
separate research project.
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The government’s market-backstopping—or market-preserving—
function, however, presents a separate set of problems, for which a
separate solution may be necessary. The next section discusses one such
potential solution.
C. Market-Preserving: Reinventing the “Golden Share” Mechanism
As discussed above, one of the federal government’s critical functions
is what we call market-preserving. Typical examples of this function
include temporary, emergency-driven injections of liquidity in private
markets as a last-resort mechanism for preventing such markets’ imminent
collapse.199 Sometimes, however, market-preserving efforts go beyond the
traditional lender or market-maker of last resort operations and involve
direct capital injections into private firms whose failure is considered too
potentially costly or destabilizing for the market.200 In this capacity, the
government acts as an “investor of last resort.”201 These extraordinary
actions are inevitably controversial and politicized, as they make explicit
the reallocation of risk and loss from specific private parties to the
taxpaying public in general.202 Bailouts are often seen as a public act of
socializing losses from socially detrimental market activities that
generated significant private gains for those who recklessly pursued them.
1. Bailouts, Banks, and the Public Interest
During the global financial crisis of 2008, this familiar scenario was
replayed on a new scale. To prevent unravelling of the complex global
network of interconnected financial markets in the fall of 2008, the US
government embarked on a wide-ranging program of liquidity provision
and capital support for privately-owned financial institutions.203 As a
result, the US Treasury became a self-professed “reluctant shareholder”—
often a controlling one—in several private companies, including American
199. See supra Part II.D.
200. See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943 (2009)
(detailing the dynamics of the federal bailout of American International Group).
201. See Jeffrey Manns, Building Better Bailouts: The Case for a Long-Term Investment
Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349, 1383–97 (2011) (arguing for the need to institutionalize the federal
government’s role as an “investor of last resort”).
202. For an insightful discussion of this phenomenon, see Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis
Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051, 1071–76 (2009).
203. See supra notes 62–67 and accompanying text.
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International Group (AIG), Citigroup, and General Motors.204 From the
outset, the Administration was eager to assure the American public that it
did not intend to interfere in the management of the rescued companies
and planned to dispose of the shares as soon as possible.205 By the end of
2014, Treasury had exited most of its TARP equity investments.206
Exiting TARP investments, however, did not end the controversy
around the federal government’s bailout strategy. Most commentators
criticized the federal government for negotiating individual deals with
troubled firms on an ad hoc basis, which led to inconsistencies and a lack
of transparency in the process and often made bailout terms economically
sub-optimal from taxpayers’ perspective.207 The Great Bailout of 2008 is
often characterized as an ultimate political victory for “too big to fail”
financial institutions, which institutionalized their immunity from market
discipline.208 The federal government’s emergency acquisition of
controlling ownership stakes in private firms also raised difficult doctrinal
and practical questions under US corporate laws ill-equipped to deal with
the sovereign shareholder.209 In this connection, some scholars’ principal
concern is with protecting minority shareholders’ rights vis-à-vis the
government, while others call for a more assertive exercise by the
government of its shareholder rights in order to protect American
taxpayers’ interests.210
204. See OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2009 42 (2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/
reports/Documents/OFS%20AFR%2009.pdf.
205. Id.
206. See OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2014 vii–ix, 12–13 (2014) available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financialstability/reports/Documents/FY2014%20OFS%20AFR%20FINAL%20-%20Nov%206%202014.pdf.
According to the Treasury’s report, by the end of 2014, the government had fully disposed of its stakes
in AIG, Citigroup, and GM, among others. Id.
207. See, e.g., Barbara Black, The U.S. as “Reluctant Shareholder”: Government, Business and
the Law, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 561, 593 (2010); Lissa L. Broome, Government Investment in
Banks: Creeping Nationalization or Prudent, Temporary Aid?, 4 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 409 (2009);
Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the
Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009).
208. See, e.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER
AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010); DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL:
UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2011).
209. For insightful discussions of such doctrinal and practical difficutlies, see Steven M. Davidoff,
Uncomfortable Embrace: Federal Corporate Ownership in the Midst of the Financial Crisis, 95
MINN. L. REV. 1733 (2011); Steven Davidoff Solomon & David Zaring, After the Deal: Fannie,
Freddie, and the Financial Crisis Aftermath, 95 B.U. L. REV. 371 (2015); Marcel Kahan & Edward
Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder: Implications for Delaware, 35 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 409 (2010).
210. For analyses of government ownership from the shareholder perspective, see Marcel Kahan
& Edward B. Rock, When the Government is the Controlling Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1293
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In short, in the aftermath of the latest crisis, public bailouts of private
firms are widely viewed as a deeply flawed method of market-preserving.
Unfortunately, they also appear to be inevitable, at least in the financial
services sector in which explicitly publicly-backed banks occupy the
center stage.211 Despite policy-makers’ public assurances to the contrary,
there is hardly any doubt that the current regulatory framework will not
prevent the next systemic crisis and that, when that crisis happens, many
banks—and numerous other financial institutions inextricably connected
to banks—will likely be bailed out.212
Banks are special in that they perform important public functions—
such as providing transactional accounts, operating payments system, and
serving as channels for transmission of monetary policy—and are
inherently vulnerable to creditor runs.213 But banks are also very “special”
entities in a deeper, constitutive sense: though organized as privatelyowned corporations, banks are quintessential public-private
partnerships.214 Unlike regular business corporations, US banks receive an
expressly conditioned governmental grant of authority to conduct only the
legislatively defined business of banking.215 In effect, the government
authorizes banks to perform vital public functions—creation of money and
allocation of credit—for private gain.216 Thus, banking is not a purely
private economic enterprise: it is also a delegated public-policy
responsibility.217
(2011); J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 27
YALE J. ON REG. 283 (2010). For a more taxpayer-oriented approach, see generally Black, supra note
207; Cheryl D. Block, Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 149
(2010); Manns, supra note 201.
211. See Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435 (2011) (arguing that it is
impossible to eliminate the possibility of bailing out financial institutions posing systemic risk).
212. See id. at 483–84.
213. For a classic articulation of this argument, see FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS,
ANNUAL REPORT 1982: ARE BANKS SPECIAL? (1982).
214. Political scientist David Ciepley makes a broader argument that all modern business
corporations are properly understood as hybrid, public-private entities that are fundamentally
constituted by the governments chartering them. David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a
Political Theory of the Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139 (2013). We find this argument very
persuasive and seek to emphasize, further, that financial institutions display an even deeper and more
salient form of such “constitutive” hybridity inherent in the corporate form.
215. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2014) (setting forth statutory limits on the “business of banking”).
216. See Morgan Ricks, Money and (Shadow) Banking: A Thought Experiment, 31 REV. BANKING
& FIN. L. 731 (2012) (explaining the role of banks in money creation).
217. Id. at 739 (“[D]epository banks, then, are engaged in a joint venture with the government: a
public-private partnership. They are licensed agents of the state, chartered for the efficient distribution
of the money supply.”).
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The government subjects banks to relatively intrusive regulation and
supervision and retains the right to revoke any bank’s charter for failure to
comply with its rules.218 The federal government also explicitly guarantees
privately-owned banks’ debt to their depositors and commits to support
banks experiencing temporary liquidity problems.219 This explicit public
guarantee inevitably “leaks” to their non-bank affiliates and trading
counterparties, so that all of the major financial intermediaries in today’s
interconnected marketplace effectively enjoy an implicit public subsidy.220
This subsidy is very difficult to measure and price in any individual case,
partly because it is so widespread and deeply embedded in complex
financial inter-linkages that it becomes almost invisible.221 But it is not
difficult to see that, in the final analysis, the government—as a
representative of the taxpaying public—stands behind private financial
firms’ balance sheets. In fact, an individual banking institution’s entire
balance sheet can be viewed as a “thick bundle of contingent claims on the
government.”222
This insufficiently appreciated but fundamental fact creates a puzzling
inconsistency in our commonly accepted view of the business world.
Corporate law generally identifies stockholders’ equity with residual riskbearing and accepts the intuitively just principle of reserving voting and
management rights in a particular enterprise to the shareholders most
exposed to the risk of its failure. The intuition behind this principle is that
shareholders should be able to take preventative measures lowering their
risk of loss. However, when it comes to banks, it is the government—the
public—that ultimately bears the most residual risk of bank failure. Yet,
218. See 12 U.S.C. § 93 (2014) (containing provisions governing termination of the rights and
privileges of a national bank that commits certain violations of the National Bank Act).
219. See, e.g., RICHARD S. CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 60–63 (5th ed.
2013) (briefly describing the role of the Federal Reserve as the lender of last resort and the FDIC’s role
as the insurer of bank deposits).
220. For a discussion of certain legal aspects of this phenomenon, see Saule T. Omarova, From
Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve
Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683 (2011).
221. For one recent estimate of this implicit subsidy, see VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., THE END OF
MARKET DISCIPLINE? INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS OF IMPLICIT GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES (2014),
available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sternfin/vacharya/public_html/pdfs/endofmarketdiscipline
06242014.pdf.
222. Anna Gelpern, Common Capital: A Thought Experiment in Cross-Border Resolution, 49
TEX. INT’L L.J. 355, 356 (2014). According to Gelpern:
Like the public-policy functions, government commitments permeate the bank balance sheet.
Central-bank liquidity support, deposit insurance, regulatory valuation of assets and
liabilities, and resolution procedures all represent government commitments that shape the
way in which a bank does business.
Id.
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notwithstanding this most basic determinant of ownership and control
rights, the government does not have any such rights in privately-owned
financial institutions. Perhaps, this is so because the risk is presumed to be
too remote, or because there is no specific number on the bank’s balance
sheet showing the exact amount of the public subsidy, or because the
taxpaying public is presumed to be sufficiently protected through
government regulation. In light of our post-crisis wisdom, however, these
assumptions do not appear credible. The American public is inevitably and
continuously exposed to risks generated by publicly-subsidized, privatelyowned financial institutions: simply because it is difficult to put a single
number on the amount of such subsidy or such risk does not mean they are
not real.
From that perspective, a conceptually coherent way to prevent the
pernicious combination of socialized losses and privatized gains in the
financial sector would be to restore the natural connection between risk
and control. Since it is unrealistic to expect private financial firms to
internalize the systemic risks they pose, the logical solution is to formalize
the public’s residual risk-bearing role by granting it direct control rights in
such firms.
Recognizing the public’s de facto equity-like stake on financial firms’
balance sheets can open up new possibilities for systemic crisis
prevention. Instead of debating how to structure better bailouts, we can
start imagining how the government can use its internal firm-management
rights to prevent bailouts. In essence, this approach would reinvent the
government as a “manager of last resort” whose goal is to avoid having to
perform all other “last-resort” roles. This shift in the posture of the
government—from an external source of command-and-control to an
internal stakeholder—can potentially lead to greater internalization by
private firms’ owners, directors, and managers of a more explicitly public
perspective in decision-making. This may be a difficult and gradual
process but, if successful, it could serve as an effective ex ante alternative
to bailouts and other ex post market-preserving measures.
2. Traditional “Golden Share” Model
The mechanism of a “special” or “golden” share in a private firm held
by the government is a potentially promising precedent for
operationalizing this new market-preserving, stability-enhancing
technique. There is no single, legally precise definition of the golden share
as a type of financial instrument. The term denotes a wide range of legal
arrangements granting the government special, exclusive and non-
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transferable, governance rights in privately-owned enterprises.223 Golden
shares gained popularity during the worldwide wave of privatizations of
state-owned companies in the 1980s. Thus, when Margaret Thatcher’s
conservative government privatized large and economically significant
British enterprises—including Britoil, Aerospace, British Telecom, and
Jaguar—it retained a special “golden share” in each of these newly private
companies, which allowed the government to out-vote other
shareholders.224 The governments of France, Turkey, Israel, and numerous
post-communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe followed the
British example by reserving a variety of special corporate governance and
super-voting rights in privatized firms.225
Typically, this mechanism was used to ensure continuing national, as
opposed to foreign, control over privatized companies deemed to be
strategically important.226 Governments also retained golden shares in
enterprises in order to avoid or minimize the post-privatization social
dislocation or political unrest.227 The golden share was a flexible
mechanism that could be adjusted to fit particular circumstances, often on
a company-by-company basis.228 The golden share gave the government
disproportionate voting power with respect to the election of the
company’s directors and various strategic decisions affecting the operation
of the company (e.g., decisions to merge, dispose of material assets, or
223. According to one definition:
Golden shares can be defined as a power to veto certain changes in the corporate charter.
More specifically, the term refers either to a particular class of stock or a regulatory system
that gives the state a continuing power over certain fundamental corporate decisions
especially with respect to formerly state owned enterprises that have been privatized.
Larry Catá Backer, The Private Law of Public Law: Public Authorities as Shareholders, Golden
Shares, Sovereign Wealth Funds, and the Public Law Element in Private Choice of Law, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 1801, 1806 n.12 (2008).
224. See Andrei A. Baev, Is There a Niche for the State in Corporate Governance? Securitization
of State-Owned Enterprises and New Forms of State Ownership, 18 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 20 (1995);
Alice Pezard, The Golden Share of Privatized Companies, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 85, 85 (1995).
225. See Baev, supra note 224, at 21–22 (describing the use of “golden shares” in various
countries).
226. See Pezard, supra note 224, at 86–87. The “national interest” in these cases typically covered
activities linked to national security (defense industry), economic protection (energy supplies), and
transportation and infrastructure (airlines, railroads, etc.). Id. In most European countries, the golden
share allowed the government to block foreign acquisitions of corporate control in nationally important
companies. Id.
227. See Baev, supra note 224, at 36–38 (describing the “politically sensitive” rationale).
228. See Stefan Grundmann & Florian Möslein, Golden Shares: State Control in Privatised
Companies: Comparative Law, European Law and Policy Aspects, 2001 EUR. BANKING & FIN. L.J.
623.
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enter or discontinue a particular line of business).229 According to one
commentator:
Applying this technique, governments can effectively monitor
privatized enterprises without retaining a controlling equity stake in
them. Contrary to conventional shares, the golden share provides
governments with the power to monitor the ordinary commercial
activity of a corporation in addition to the standard power of
corporate governance.230
The government’s ability to affect directly a private firm’s substantive
business decisions—while not necessarily holding a majority (or even any)
economic equity stake—is a particularly promising feature of the golden
share as a potential model for designing a new mechanism for preventing
systemic financial crises. The latest financial crisis demonstrated the
danger of relying on private financial institutions’ internal risk
management and individually rational decision-making to ensure systemic
stability. Formal regulatory oversight of financial institutions’ activities, at
least in its current form, also has significant limitations, especially given
the pervasiveness of regulatory arbitrage and the increasing complexity
and opacity of financial products and transactions.231 As market
“outsiders,” financial regulators perennially lag behind private market
participants in their ability to access and process vital market information,
and their ability to act is inherently limited by various jurisdictional
constraints.232
By contrast, giving the government a direct equity stake with special
management rights in financial-service firms—that is, making the
government a firm insider—would remove many of these legal and
informational obstacles. As a special shareholder with uniquely tailored
rights, the government would acquire the new capacity to take speedy and
effective action necessary to counteract socially harmful and thus
irrational effects of pure market rationality. In that sense, this arrangement
would operate as an explicitly proactive and preventative form of the
government’s traditional market-preserving role.
229. See Baev, supra note 224, at 23–27 (enumerating key characteristics of the golden share).
230. Id. at 27.
231. For a discussion of the role complexity plays in reducing the efficacy of the current
regulatory regime, see Saule T. Omarova, License To Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex
Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 68–78 (2012).
232. See Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry SelfRegulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 431–38 (2011).
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To many, the very idea of making the federal government a direct
equity owner in private financial firms may appear too radical,
unworkable, or even dangerous. As is true for any novel proposal, it raises
potentially difficult questions of legal doctrine, administrative design, and
economic practicality. This Article does not seek to offer answers to all of
those questions. Our more modest goal is to sketch out a broad outline for
re-purposing the golden share as a new tool of ensuring systemic financial
stability and minimizing the likelihood of financial crises. How might this
new mechanism work?
3. SGS Mechanism: Outline of the Proposal
The creation of the golden share mechanism would require an act of
Congress. The main operative provision of the enabling statute would
mandate issuance by each “Covered Entity” of a single share of a special
class—“State Golden Share” or “Special Government Share” (“SGS”)—to
be beneficially and legally owned, exclusively and at all times, by the
federal government in its capacity as the “SGS Holder.”
The definition of “Covered Entity” could include all financial
institutions, by referencing either their regulatory status (broker-dealers,
FDIC-insured depository institutions, etc.) or the predominantly financial
nature of their business activities.233 Alternatively, Congress may limit the
definition to systemically important financial institutions (“SIFIs”).234 This
approach would allow the government to concentrate its efforts only on
the firms determined to pose risks to systemic stability, but its practical
efficacy depends on the accuracy of that notoriously difficult judgment. 235
With respect to financial conglomerates, it is critical that the government
hold the golden share in the top-level holding company, where all strategic
group-wide decisions are typically made and all group-wide data are
233. There are numerous legal formulations of the nature-of-activities requirement
(“substantially” financial, “predominantly” financial, etc.) and the criteria for determining whether a
firm meets it. Typically, the rules focus on the composition of the company’s total consolidated assets,
revenues, and/or income. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5311(a) (2014).
234. The statute could incorporate by reference a particular definition of SIFI under existing
regulations. See Financial Stability Oversight Council, 77 Fed. Reg. 21,637 (Apr. 11, 2012) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310).
235. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the newly created Financial Stability Oversight Committee
(“FSOC”) is charged with determining whether a particular non-banking financial company is
systemically important enough to be regulated by the Federal Reserve. To date, the FSOC has made
only a few such official determinations, some of which have been challenged by the affected
companies. See, e.g., Warren S. Hersch, MetLife Objects to SIFI Designation by FSOC,
LIFEHEALTHPRO (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2014/12/18/metlife-objects-to-sifidesignation-by-fsoc.
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aggregated and assessed. To avoid unnecessary duplication, it may make
sense not to hold golden shares in subsidiaries of the same holding
company.236
Because SGS is a federally-created instrument, its terms do not have to
comply with the requirements of state corporate laws, and its holder’s
rights and obligations can be vastly different from those of a regular
corporate shareholder. The greatest challenge in designing SGS is to find a
proper balance of public and private interests within the context of a
functioning economic enterprise. In principle, we envision the SGS as a
dynamic mechanism, a sliding scale of management rights triggered by
specified events. The SGS should be viewed as a form of conditional
rather than absolute, temporary rather than permanent, and calibrated
rather than uniformly predetermined government control over the Covered
Entity’s internal governance.
Unlike conventional shareholders, the SGS Holder would not have to
make a capital contribution in exchange for its golden share and,
generally, would not receive any dividends or distributions.237 Unless and
until one or more of the specified triggering events happen, the SGS is
meant to remain largely a passive instrument. In this period of dormancy,
the SGS Holder would not be expected or entitled to exercise any direct
management rights in the firm. Its rights would be primarily of an
informational and representational nature. It is crucial, however, that the
SGS Holder have a broad right of direct and timely access to the firm’s
internal information.238 Private firms’ right to preserve, within reasonable
limits, confidentiality of their business information would have to be
236. This approach may also be preferable as a scope-limiting device because it is based on the
organizational criteria rather than the qualitatively complex SIFI determination. Under this approach
the statute would have to preclude entity arbitrage designed to shift strategic information-gathering and
decision-making functions into corporate layers below the top parent-company.
237. The SGS can have nominal value of $1.00, at which it would be carried on the Covered
Entity’s balance sheet. This nominally-valued instrument would not entitle the government to any
economic rights of a conventional shareholder, such as the right to receive dividends or distributions.
This important feature distinguishes the proposed SGS mechanism from the more familiar instances of
government acquiring control through purchase of a majority equity stake in a firm. Structuring the
SGS as primarily (if not exclusively) a control instrument underscores its quasi-regulatory nature and
highlights the government’s role as a collective actor seeking to resolve certain market dysfunctions,
as opposed to seeking pecuniary gains. However, if the government later deems it necessary to
contribute capital to a Covered Entity, it should receive statutorily specified economic rights.
238. Financial institutions zealously guard their “proprietary” information, partly because they
fear that competitors would copy or otherwise thwart their trading or investment strategies, and partly
because opacity and complexity of their “branded” financial products effectively allow these
institutions to extract monopoly rents. For an explanation of this phenomenon of “strategic
complexity,” see Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial
Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 262–67 (2012); Omarova, supra note 231, at 68–75.
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balanced against the government’s right to know what it needs to know to
protect the public from financial harm.239
To take full advantage of its informational rights, the SGS Holder must
have permanent representation on the Covered Entity’s board of directors.
The enabling statute will need to delineate the rights and duties of special
SGS-appointed directors (“SGS Directors”), in line with the overarching
objectives of the SGS regime.240 SGS Directors are not the same as
independent directors, with their presumed neutrality and objectivity,
primarily inferred from their lack of direct financial interest in the firm.
They are representatives (and employees) of the US government, and their
primary fiduciary duties should run to the taxpaying American public. If
necessary, SGS Directors would have a right to request additional
information from the firm’s management or agents.241 It may also be
desirable to grant SGS Directors certain “baseline” special voting rights
that remain in effect at all times, even when the SGS is otherwise
“dormant.” In parallel to the traditional golden share mechanism,242 SGS
Directors’ approval may be required for certain important corporate
decisions—although the emphasis here should be primarily on matters
related to systemic financial stability.243
Generally, SGS Directors would function as our collective eyes and
ears on financial institutions’ boards, the embodiment of the governmentas-market-actor striving to correct private markets’ potentially
destabilizing and socially destructive “natural” tendencies.244 It is
reasonable to expect that their watchful presence and explicitly systemic
perspective would significantly improve boardroom dynamics and alter
239. The private firms’ interest, while subordinated in principle to the public interest, can be
reasonably protected through carefully designed procedural mechanisms limiting the SGS Holder’s
ability to use or disclose particularly sensitive trade information to other market participants.
240. How many SGS Directors should be appointed in any particular case would depend on the
individual profile, size, and other relevant circumstances of each Covered Entity. The idea here is to
have a special class of directors with special class-specific rights that, under certain circumstances,
may override purely numeric voting outcomes.
241. The statute should expressly prohibit Covered Entities from taking any action whose
intended or unintended effect would be to limit SGS Directors’ access to information or participation
in decision-making processes.
242. See sources cited supra notes 223–27 and accompanying text.
243. The SGS Directors’ approval could be required whenever the Covered Entity’s board of
directors approves the management’s strategic business plan for the company, adoption of an
executive compensation program, or appointment of external auditors. The government entity acting as
SGS Holder will determine which matters are significant enough to require SGS Directors’ review and
pre-approval, based on a particular firm’s business/risk profile, systemic footprint, and any other
relevant considerations.
244. See supra notes 103–10 and accompanying text.

170

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 93:103

the balance of power between financial firms’ boards of directors and
managers.
The occurrence of specified events would trigger additional special
rights of SGS Holder. Statutory triggering events would effectively
activate the SGS Holder’s direct management rights, shifting the entire
mechanism from its relatively passive “peacetime” state into the actively
participatory high-alert phase. Devising a precise hierarchy of statutory
triggers and corresponding SGS rights is a challenging and intensely
technical exercise that goes beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless,
it is helpful to outline some of the potentially relevant considerations.
In principle, the choice of SGS triggers should be tied to the main
policy objective of the new regime: preserving systemic financial stability
and preventing excessive accumulations of risk in the financial sector.
Special SGS rights should be activated in response to certain internal and
external signals indicating potentially greater likelihood of increasing
systemic risk or instability. Some of the familiar regulatory and
supervisory metrics—capital adequacy levels, supervisory ratings, or
stress test results—can easily double as proxies for triggering additional
SGS rights. Serious problems with a Covered Entity’s legal and regulatory
compliance, financial reporting, or internal risk management should also
serve as triggers for escalating the SGS Holder’s level of managerial
control.245 Perhaps of even greater importance are signs of emerging trends
in a particular Covered Entity’s business strategy and overall risk appetite.
For example, special SGS rights can be triggered by a potentially
problematic shift in a Covered Entity’s business and risk profile, as a
result of either acquisition-driven growth or an internally-driven change in
the composition or nature of its assets and liabilities.246
245. The trigger may be an obvious case of legal misconduct or regulatory violation, such as
participation in a price-rigging scheme or fraudulent accounting practices. Examples include recent
scandals involving analyst research conflicts of interest, LIBOR and foreign exchange rates
manipulation, or “robo-signing” and other illegal home loan foreclosure practices of large US banks. A
particular firm implicated in, or subject to investigation in connection with, any such scandal would
risk immediate triggering of additional SGS management rights. The SGS rights may also be triggered
in response to a series of less egregious violations indicating a troublesome pattern of the
management’s failure to ensure compliance with laws and regulations.
246. Potential tell-tale signs may include rapid growth of particular asset categories in a Covered
Entity’s or its key subsidiaries’ portfolios (e.g., certain types of ABS), a discernible increase in the
volume or riskiness of certain types of off-balance-sheet transactions (e.g., credit default swaps), or
rising levels or changing tenor of the company’s or its key subsidiaries’ liabilities (e.g., increased
reliance on borrowing in wholesale securities repurchase markets).

2015]

PUBLIC ACTORS IN PRIVATE MARKETS

171

Size-related metrics may be particularly useful as potential triggers. 247
Any absolute quantitative size trigger should be set at the level that would
pick up all financial institutions that are potentially “too big to fail”
(“TBTF”). This threat of potentially intrusive governmental “meddling” in
large firms’ internal business affairs may operate as a significant deterrent
against becoming TBTF.
Enhanced SGS rights might also be triggered simultaneously across all
Covered Entities (or their relevant subset) by sudden accelerations in
credit growth across the financial system, which may indicate excessive
build-up of risk and leverage feeding a speculative asset bubble. The
government could arrest this potentially destabilizing systemic trend by
exercising its special SGS rights to veto or slow down certain kinds of
lending (or borrowing) activities pursued by individual firms. Building
external triggers into the SGS mechanism would enhance its utility as a
complement to the government’s regulatory efforts.248
Defining and applying SGS triggers is a challenging and contextspecific exercise that requires an individualized assessment of all relevant
factors. It is, therefore, critical to allow the SGS Holder a significant
degree of discretion in deciding when exactly its special rights should be
triggered, and how exactly they should be used. To ensure accountability,
the enabling statute will need to provide both a clear normative basis for
the exercise of discretion249 and a robust procedural framework for making
entity-specific SGS trigger determinations.250
In the post-trigger mode, the government would essentially assume its
(temporary) role as the manager of last resort. In this role, the SGS Holder
would have broad veto powers allowing it to block any decision by a
247. Under current regulations, financial institutions with more than $50 billion in total
consolidated assets are generally presumed to be systemically important. Non-banking financial
companies that meet this size threshold are further evaluated for systemic significance based on a mix
of quantitative and qualitative criteria. See, e.g., Financial Stability Oversight Council, 77 Fed. Reg. at
21,659.
248. Thus, SGS Holder’s demand that individual firms raise more equity as a condition to
continuing their lending activities would function as an internal-governance complement to regulatory
“dynamic provisioning” and counter-cyclical capital buffer requirements.
249. Because correct and timely recognition and interpretation of market signals is inherently
difficult, it is important to introduce an explicitly precautionary principle into this exercise. For a
discussion of the role of precautionary principle in financial services regulation, see Hilary J. Allen, A
New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 173 (2013).
250. Generally, accountability-enhancing procedural rules are a well-established and familiar
element of regulatory design. In devising such rules for the SGS regime, one may be able to draw on a
variety of existing examples.
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Covered Entity’s board or shareholders.251 It would have the right to call
shareholder meetings with specific agenda.252 In practice, the SGS Holder
would likely act through the firm’s serving SGS Director(s), transforming
their role from that of passive monitors to that of active decision-makers.
In effect, SGS Directors would take control of the board’s actions.253
Generally, they would have a right to impose temporary moratoria on
shareholder distributions and major corporate transactions; to suspend or
remove any manager or officer of the firm; to call special board meetings
with specific agenda; and to propose specific resolutions for the board’s
vote.254 For instance, SGS Directors could propose board resolutions
halting specific high-risk trading or investment activities, reducing the
firm’s risk exposure by selling certain assets or unwinding trading
positions, revising internal policies and procedures governing activities in
question, raising more equity and reducing the firm’s leverage, and
suspending or replacing individual managers or executive officers. If these
measures prove insufficient to resolve and prevent likely recurrence of the
firm’s problems, SGS Directors could propose to the board a resolution
mandating sale of certain subsidiaries or segments of the firm’s business—
a measure that could effectively break up a TBTF entity. If, on the other
hand, the less drastic corrective measures work, so that the degree of
systemic risk posed by the Covered Entity’s activities is reduced below the
statutory trigger level, the SGS would revert to its dormant state and SGS
Directors would relinquish their special rights, in accordance with the
procedure specified in the statute.
While it is possible to vest the SGS Holder responsibilities in one of
the existing financial regulators, such as the Federal Reserve or FDIC, it is
preferable to establish either a new federal agency or a federally-chartered
251. Of course, the government should not exercise its broad veto rights indiscriminately. The
idea is simply to give the government the necessary flexibility to take whatever measures are called for
under the circumstances.
252. It may be desirable to grant the SGS Holder super-majority voting power, but only with
respect to matters that are expressly determined by the SGS Holder to be critically important for the
preservation of the long-term stability of the US financial system. The statute would have to establish
procedural rules that the SGS Holder, or any of its agents, must follow in making the required
determination of “critical importance.”
253. The extent, nature, and specific mechanisms of such control would depend on the nature and
severity of the SGS-triggering concerns and other relevant circumstances.
254. Again, it may be desirable to grant SGS Directors super-majority voting power with respect
to matters expressly determined to be critically important for the preservation of the long-term stability
of the US financial system, as provided in the enabling statute. See sources cited supra note 249 and
accompanying text.
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government corporation to act as the SGS Holder.255 It may be desirable to
combine the functions of the SGS Holder and those of the NCMC,
discussed earlier, in a single government entity.256 If designed properly,
this new combined entity can effectively become the institutional
embodiment of the modern developmental finance state.257 That, however,
is the next stage in our model-building process.258 Generally, institutional
design choices—i.e., deciding which specific government actor should
perform the proposed functions, how it should be organized and governed,
and how it should interact with other public and private entities—are
critically important elements of our vision of a developmental finance
state. They are also sufficiently complex to deserve a separate, more
nuanced treatment.
At this stage, our goal was to sketch out some of the principal elements
of an SGS mechanism that builds on, but goes beyond the limited confines
of, Europe’s original “golden share” arrangements.259 Our proposal raises
many questions and leaves many details to be filled in at a later point.260 It
255. The choice between a federal agency and a government corporation has significant
consequences. The US federal government has a long history of chartering special government
corporations, many of which operate under a unique set of privileges and constraints. See, e.g., Lebron
v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 384–91 (1995) (describing the history of Amtrak and
other government-chartered corporations). For an analysis of the functions and organizational
structures of government corporations and quasi-governmental entities, see A. Michael Froomkin,
Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 543; Anne J. O’Connell, Bureaucracy
at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841 (2014); Benjamin A. Templin, The Government Shareholder:
Regulating Public Ownership of Private Enterprise, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1127 (2010).
256. We briefly suggested setting up such an umbrella agency—a National Investment Authority,
or NIA—when discussing the NCMC model. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. NCMC and
the SGS Holder are fundamentally similar in their missions and their primary mode of action as
endogenous financial market participants. NCMC’s investment operations could serve as the source of
independent financing of the SGS Holder’s activities. NCMC’s focus on financing and guiding nationwide economic development and the SGS Holder’s focus on preserving financial and economic
stability are complementary, which bodes well for the emergence of a shared institutional culture.
257. To be effective, this new entity would have to (1) have the necessary technical and financialmanagement expertise, (2) be democratically accountable but sufficiently insulated from political
pressure, and (3) be able to resist “capture” by private interests. For an insightful discussion of the
many forms of regulatory capture and potential ways of minimizing its harmful effects, see James
Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL
INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 71 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014);
Lawrence G. Baxter, “Capture” in Financial Regulation: Can We Channel It Toward the Common
Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175 (2011); Lawrence G. Baxter, Understanding Regulatory
Capture: An Academic Perspective From the United States, in THE MAKING OF GOOD FINANCIAL
REGULATION 53 (Stefano Pagliari ed., 2012).
258. We plan to elaborate further on the proposed NIA structure in subsequent work.
259. See sources cited supra notes 223–30 and accompanying text.
260. An important set of issues that needs to be addressed in greater detail concerns the relative
rights of private shareholders in Covered Entities vis-à-vis the SGS Holder. The federal government’s
emergency equity investments under TARP raised difficult issues regarding the availability of judicial
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may ultimately prove to be too difficult or politically toxic to implement in
practice. Yet, it may also be more plausible than the critics are willing to
acknowledge. At the very least, it suggests a new direction for the
important debate on the complex relationship between public and private,
states and markets, finance and development.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have sought to begin the much-needed process of
deep rethinking of the federal government’s role in today’s financial
markets. We have argued that, contrary to the dominant narrative, the
government is not merely an exogenous force acting upon private financial
markets in its traditional supervisory or constitutive capacity. The
government is also an endogenous force acting within financial markets in
a directly participatory capacity. Not only does it correct pervasive market
failures and provide vital public goods, but it also creates, moves,
amplifies, and preserves private markets in ways that enhance these
markets’ potential to serve important long-term public interests—interests
that do not always fit neatly under the orthodox categories of public goods
provision and market failure.
All too often, however, this proactive market-actor role of the
government is taken for granted and invisible, so its transformative
potential remains hidden and unappreciated as well. This Article has tried
to shed some light both on the existing forms of the government-asmarket-actor modality and on potential ways to expand the government’s
market-actor toolkit in pursuit of the more ambitious goal of continuous
and stable long-term national development.
Our proposals for expanding the range and increasing the intensity of
the government-as-market-actor modality are unorthodox, ambitious, and
bound to attract criticism. Some critics may, intentionally or
unintentionally, misconstrue our concept of a developmental finance state
as a direct attack on free market enterprise and advocacy of socialist
central planning—both of which are commonly thought of as
fundamentally un-American. Any such inference would be incorrect. The
idea of a strong, visionary state mobilizing, augmenting, and channeling
and administrative review of the government’s actions in its new capacity as a controlling shareholder.
Many scholars emphasized the need to protect private shareholders against the governmentshareholder’s politically-driven actions that could negatively affect the corporation’s profitability. See
sources cited supra notes 209–10. We recognize the significance of addressing these legal issues for
the viability of the SGS regime and intend to do so in subsequent work.
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private finance toward economic projects critical to the nation’s long-term
development and growth is deeply rooted in US history. The country’s
first Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton, was the first modern
statesman to devise a comprehensive developmental strategy for the
American Republic. At the heart of Hamilton’s strategy was the creation
of a strong public-private system of finance that would, on the one hand,
underwrite federal monetary control and credit allocation and, on the other
hand, aggregate and channel vital resources toward building American
industry and trade. In essence, Hamilton’s vision was that of an emerging
developmental finance state. In this Article, we seek to reclaim this
uniquely American heritage.
Other predictable criticisms might proceed along the familiar lines
brilliantly identified by Albert Hirschman as the “perversity,” “futility,”
and “jeopardy” theses:
According to the perversity thesis, any purposive action to improve
some feature of the political, social, or economic order only serves
to exacerbate the condition one wishes to remedy. The futility thesis
holds that attempts at social transformation will be unavailing, that
they will simply fail to “make a dent.” Finally, the jeopardy thesis
argues that the cost of the proposed change or reform is too high as
it endangers some previous, precious accomplishment.261
To the extent that these arguments, commonly encountered in the
debate on financial sector regulation, represent self-interested or
ideologically-driven reactions to progressive change, they rarely generate
a productive intellectual exchange. This is not to say, however, that we
consider our task completed. We are fully mindful that important further
details must be elaborated, ambiguities resolved, and potential legal and
administrative issues addressed before our broadly outlined vision could
become more of a blueprint for action. We plan to continue that work. For
now, a constructive debate on the pros and cons of what we have called
here a developmental finance state would be a significant step toward a
better understanding and appreciation of the role of public actors in private
markets.
261. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY 7
(1991).

